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Acid Mine Drainage and the Pennsylvania Courts
Robert Broughton,* Thomas A Koza,**
and Gary F Selway***
On March 16, 1973, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued two
landmark decisions relating to coal mine drainage in PennsylvaniaCommonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co. and Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh
Coal Co.' One month later, on April 16, 1973, a third major acid mine
drainage case, Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,2 was decided by
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Since these cases deal with
major federal constitutional issues, as well as with some of the most
critical technical and philosophical problems of any mine acid pollution
control program, this seems an appropriate moment to review the en
tire problem. of acid mine drainage and to assess the state of the law
relating to that problem in light of Harmarand Pittsburgh and Barnes
& Tucker
We will briefly review first, the nature of the acid mine drainage
problem. Then we will trace the history of the law in Pennsylvania as
it relates and has related to that problem. Finally, analysis of Harmar
and Pittsburgh and Barnes & Tucker will be undertaken. Specific attention will be focused upon what these three cases say and what they
do not say and an attempt will be made to assess their impact on the
way the problem may be dealt with in the future.
THE

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Mine drainage, for our purposes, is any drainage from a coal mine,
whether surface or underground. When coal is removed from an underB.A., Haverford College, 1956; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1959; M.A. (Economics),
University of Pittsburgh, 1970; Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law;
Chairman, Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.
00 B.S. (Mining Engineenng), The Pennsylvania State University, 1969; 4th year evening
student, Duquesne University School of Law. Mr. Koza is the Book Review Editor of the
Duquesne Law Review.
*0 B.S., Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 1970; 3d year evening student, Duquesne
University School of Law.
1. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973). These
cases were decided separately by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court as Harmar Coal
Co. v. Sanitary Water Board, 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. 435, 285 A.2d 898 (1972), and Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board, 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. 407, 286 A.2d 459 (1972). They were
consolidated on appeal and hereinafter will be referred to as Hartnarand Pittsburgh when
referring to the opinion for both cases.
2. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
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ground seam that is below the top of the area water table, then water
will flow into the newly formed cavity from surface streams or underground sources, unless blocked by dams or impermeable rock layers.
When coal is mined by stripping, rainfall will contact the coal or adjacent layers.
Such water picks up various constituents in the coal, and these constituents undergo chemical alteration in solution. In nature, this would
be a process of chemical weathering of coal layers that normally would
occur at a relatively slow rate, and would not affect any substantial
proportion of the streams in an area at the same time.3 Mining activity
concentrates the effects of those normal processes so that they can become serious statewide and regional problems. Mine drainage pollution
affects, for example, approximately 10,500 miles of streams in the Appalachian region, primarily in the northern section.4 Of that 10,500
miles, 5,700 miles are affected by acid mine drainage; and three-fourths
of those 5,700 milies are in the Monongahela, Allegheny, Susquehanna,
Potomac, and Delaware River basins in Pennsylvania, West Virginia
and Maryland. 5 Even more striking, of the total miles of streams in the
Appalachian Regional Commission area affected by acid mine drainage,
29% are in the Monongahela River watershed, 18.4% are in the Allegheny River watershed, and 18% are in the West Branch Susquehanna River watershed, over 65% within about 150 miles of the
"home" of this Law Review.6 Acid mine drainage is thus a surprisingly
local problem; at the same time, its very geographic concentration indicates its seriousness to the economy and environment of Western
Pennsylvania and Northern West Virginia.
The coal mine drainage problem is largely the result of the formation of acid and iron pollutants when the pyrite and marcasite (iron
disulfides) associated with coalbeds are exposed to the atmosphere and
water. 7 Simply stated, when coal is extracted, the pyrites in the mine
3. APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION, AcID MINE DRAINAGE IN APPALACHIA 15 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as APPALACHIA STUDY].
4. Id. at iii, 6.
5. Id. at 6. See also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The Incidence and Formation of
Mine Drainage Pollution in Appalachia, in AcID MINE DRAINAGE IN APPALACHIA app. C
(1969) (detailed, basin by basin analysis) [hereinafter cited as App. C APPALACHIA STUDY].
6. Id. at 27 (Table 5).
7. Caruccio, An Evaluation of Factors Affecting Acid Mine Drainage Production and
the Ground Water Interactions in Selected Areas of Western Pennsylvania, in SECOND
SYMPOSIUM ON COAL MINE DRAINAGE RESEARCH 107 (G. Barthauer chairman 1968) [hereinafter cited as Caruccio]. See also App. C APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 5, at C-20 to -24.
8. The natural contamination of underground pools is described as follows:
It is generally agreed that pollution occurs in mine water as a result of iron and
acid salts being dissolved in the water. The iron and acid salts are formed on the
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are exposed to air and water.8 A chemical reaction takes place and the
pyrite is oxidized to form ferrous sulfate and sulfuric acid. This reaction can be represented by the following equation:9
2FeS2 + 702 + XH 20 ---> 2FeSO 4 • XH 2 O + 2H 2 SO 4

(1)

The ferrous sulfate and sulfuric acid thus formed are washed or seep
off the coal mine walls into the ground water flowing through the mine
where further hydrolizing or oxidizing takes place, and ferric iron and
additional acids are formed.
The ferrous sulfate is then hydrolized according to the following
equation to form ferrous iron: 10
FeSO 4 • XH 20 + 2HOH

±

Fe (OH)2 + S0

4

- + 2H+ + XH 20

(2)

Next, the ferrous iron produced in equation (2) is oxidized to the ferric

state and additional acidity results, as in equation (3): 11
Fe(OH) 2 + HOH - Fe(OH)3 + H+

(3)

The end result of the above reactions is that the receiving stream is
loaded with sulfates, acid and iron hydroxides, as well as such dissolved
minerals as aluminum, calcium, magnesium, manganese, and ferrous
iron.12 The iron hydroxides (ferrous and ferric) produced in equations
(2) and (3) impart the red color which is characteristic of acid mine
drainage. The most frequently observed product of acid mine drainage
is "yellowboy," a slightly soluble iron hydroxide which precipitates out
into the streambeds.' 3
The gravity of the acid mine drainage problem is dependent upon
several factors. First, it depends upon the amount of sulfuritic material
(pyrites), oxygen, and water available for the reactive process described
surface of coal measures exposed to the mine atmosphere by the oxidation of pyritic
material in the exposed coal. The salts are then washed into the mine water, causing
pollution. Thus, underground pools of water are continually being polluted and
will continue to be so for perhaps hundreds of years, unless the mine workings are
completely flooded, eliminating the air required for oxidation.
4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 418-19 n.6, 286 A.2d at 465 n.6 (quoted from Brief for Sanitary Water
Board).
9. Caruccio, supra note 7, at 107; App. C APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 5, at C-20.
10. Caruccio, supra note 7, at 107; App. C APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 5, at C-20 to
-22.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Caruccio, supra note 7, at 107-08.
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above.1 4 The initial reaction is' seldom limited by a lack of water or
oxygen, as both of these elements are readily available. The water is
supplied as vapor in the air or by the ground water flowing through the
mine, and the oxygen comes from the air. The amount of oxygen can
be eliminated or reduced substantially by flooding the mine to submerge the pyrites in water or by sealing the mine to shut off air flow.
(These are control techniques that will be discussed below.) In general,
however, the greater the amount of pyrites available, the greater the
acidity of the mine drainage.
Second, the gravity of the mine drainage problem depends upon the
type of mine involved.1 5 Auger mines and mines which leave pillars of
coal continually expose new pyrites to the water and air as the roof and
mine walls cave in after the mine has been abandoned. Furthermore,
self-draining underground mines have a seemingly inexhaustible
supply of water flowing through them which can react with the pyrites.
Third, the severity of the acid mine drainage problem depends upon
the alkalinity of the surrounding strata and receiving waters.' 6 If the
surrounding strata contains limestone, the acid mine drainage may be
neutralized or may even be made alkaline. The same will happen if
the receiving stream contains alkalines supplied by nature or by industries discharging into the stream.
It is interesting, and relevant for analysis of the potential impact of
Harmar and Pittsburgh and Barnes & Tucker, to note the distribution
of sources. Underground mines produce 71.3% of all mine acid drainage, although they constitute only 58% of the number of individual
sources.1 7 Inactive underground mines, constituting 53% of the sources,
contribute 52.5% of the total acid mine drainage.' 8 Active underground
mines, on the other hand, contribute 18.8% of total acid mine drainage, although they constitute only 5% of the total sources.19 Thus, not
14.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAw, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COAL MINE RECA STUDY IN MARYLAND, OHIO, PENNSYLVANIA AND WEST VIRGINIA 27-29 (1972)

LAMATION:

(Grant No. 14010 FZU from the Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter cited as
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COAL MINE RECLAMATION].

15. Id.
16. Limestone beds are present in the surrounding strata of the bituminous coal
fields in Western Pennsylvania and are responsible for alkaline discharges from the Pittsburgh and Sewickley coal seams. Emrich & Thompson, Some Characteristics of Drainage
from Deep Bituminous Mines in Western Pennsylvania,in SECOND SY1VPOSIUM ON COAL MINE
DRAINAGE RESEARCH 190, 222 (G. Barthauer chairman 1968).
17. APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 3, at 36, 41 (Table 5).
18. Id. at 36 (Table 5).
19. See also Charmbury, Buscavage & Manevil, Pennsylvania's Abandoned Mine Drainage Pollution Abatement Program, in SECOND SyMwosIuM ON COAL MINE DRAINAGE RESEARCH 319 (G. Barthauer chairman 1968) (estimated that in Pennsylvania, approximately
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only is the acid mine drainage problem concentrated geographically, it
is also concentrated in one segment of the mining industry. " Failure to -treat the problem will have a concentrated effect on economic development in Western Pennsylvania and Northern West Virginia. The billions of gallons of acid mine drainage which enter Pennsylvania's streams and waters have far reaching and detrimental effects.
Municipal water supplies are impaired and the water companies incur
additional costs in treating water polluted with mine drainage. Industrial users who need-water for boilers or 'cooling purposes must first
treat such water or face higher maintenance costs and reduced equipment life because of corrosion. 20 Barges, boats, bridge piers, d*m-structures, etc. also are affected by the corrosion from 'such mine waters. Fish
and other aquatic life are either killed or diminished. The recreational
value -of -a stream polluted with acid mine drainage is reduced substantially. Fishermen, boaters, swimmers, andwwater skiers do not enjoy
and thus Will not use 'waterswith a high acidity and streambeds covered
with " yellowboy." 21 Furthermore, a red-brown stream filled with an
eyesore such as "yellowby"-a sight that is probably familiai- to all
Pennsylvanians and West Virginians-has far less aesthetic value.
TREATMENT AND CONTROL OF ACID MINE DRAINAGE

The acid mine drainage problem need not go unattended. Millions
of dollars, have been expended by federal and state agencies, private
research institutions, and various industrial firms in researching
methods for reducing or eliminating the effects of acid mine drainage.
Today, there are four basic methods for dealing with the problem.

They are: (1) treatment to remove mine. acid; (2) abatement at the
1.5 billion gallons of 'add mine drainage is discharged each. day, of which over 1.0 billion
gallons comes from abandoned mines) [hereinafter cited: as Charmbury].
20.

Battelle Memorial Institute, The Impact of Mine Drainage Pollution on Industrial

Water Users in Appalachia, in Acm MINE DRAINAGE IN AP1ALACmAtapp. A (1969) [hereinafter cited as App. A APPALAcsuA STUDY]. The following total annual savings to -all
industries from reductions in mine drainage pollution in Appalachia (1) by reduction
at the mine source (e.g., by sealing the mine) or (2) by lime neutralization was estimated:
Estimated Annual Savings
Degree of Reduction
30 percent
60 percent
90 percent

Reduction at Source

$

530,000
990,000
1,230,000

Lime Neutralization
$370,000
410,000
490,000

Id.. at 1.
- 21.

LEGAL PRoBLEMs OF COAL MINE RECLAMATON, supra note 14, at 30-31; see text

accompanying note 13 supra.
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source; (3) deep well disposal; and (4) dilution. 22 Before any method is
chosen, however, the specific source of drainage, the nature of the
drainage, the character and use of the land and receiving waters, the
amount of money available, and the legal requirements all must be
taken into consideration.
Treatment to Remove Mine Acid
The various treatment techniques available include: neutralization,
distillation, reverse osmosis, ion exchange, freezing, and electrodialysis. 25 Neutralization is probably the most widely tested and used treatment technique. Basically, neutralization involves reducing the acidity
of the mine water drainage and the removal of iron and other dissolved
minerals. It is accomplished by treating the acid mine water with lime,
limestone, or limestone followed with lime.24 Because treatment with
limestone is cheaper than lime, provides a more compact precipitated
sludge, has no deleterious effects if overtreated with water, and has
relatively low operating and maintenance costs, it appears to25be the
best of the known methods for acid mine water neutralization.
A flowsheet of the process for treating mine water with limestone is
shown in Figure 1.26 The main features of a limestone treatment plant
are a holding pond for water pumped from the mine, a tubemill or
grinder for mixing the mine water with limestone, an aeration pond,
and settling ponds for the resulting sludge. The treated effluent which
flows from the settling ponds can be discharged into a stream or river.
Although the neutralization process seems to be a solution to the
mine drainage problem, it has two disadvantages. First, a large volume
22. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COAL MINE RECLAMATION, supra note 14, at 31; see Cyrus W.
Rice & Co., Engineering Economic Study of Mine Drainage control Techniques, in ACID
MINE DRAINAGE IN APPALACHIA app. B, at 4-15 (1969) [hereinafter cited as App. B
APPALACHIA STUDY].

23. App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22 passim; Martin & Hill, Mine Drainage
Research Program of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, in SECOND
SYMPOSIUM ON COAL MINE DRAINAGE RESEARCH 52 (G. Barthauer chairman 1968) [hereinafter cited as Martin & Hill].
24. See M. DEUL & E. MIHOK, MINE WATER RESEARCH: NEUTRALIZATION (1967) (Bureau
of Mines Report of Investigations -.6987); E. MIHOg, M. DEUL, C. CHAMBERLAIN & J. SELMECZI, MINE WATER RESEARCH: THE LIMESTONE NEUTRALIZATION PROCESS (1968) (Bureau of

Mines Report of Investigations 7191); Charmbury, supra note 19; App. B APPALACHIA
STUDY, supra note 22, at 17-30.
25. App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22, at 25-28; Address by Maurice Deul,
Seventy-Second National Western Mining Conference, Colorado Mining Association, Denver, Colorado, Jan. 30, 1969.
26. Figure 1 was taken from E. MIHOK, MINE WATER RESEARCH: PLANT DESIGN AND
COST ESTIMATES FOR LIMESTONE TREATMENT 2 (1970) (Bureau of Mine Report of Investigations 7368).
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of sludge is produced which is difcult to dispose.2 7 One possible remedy for this problem is to pump the sludge back into abandoned
sections of the mine. Second, the treated water has an increased hardness which may make it undesirable for domestic use and may require
28
treatment for certain industrial uses.
Abatement at the Source
Abatement at the source is another method for reducing or eliminating acid mine drainage. The ultimate objective of this control method
is to reduce or eliminate either the oxygen or water or pyrites required
for the formation of acid mine water. The techniques which have been
tried include mine flooding, water diversion, mine air sealing, surface
29
restoration, and revegetation.
The purpose of mine flooding is to submerge the pyrites so that
oxygen cannot react with them to form acid. This technique is effective
in strip mines and in underground mines which do not have openings
to the surface. For mines with openings above surface water levels,
27. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COAL MINE RECLAMATION, supra note 14, at 32.
28. Id.; App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22, at 22-24, 27.
29. Martin & Hill, supra note 23, at 52. See also LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COAL MINE
RECLAMATION, supra note 14, at 32; App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22, at 97, 115,
130, 136 passim.
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mine seals have to be constructed at the openings; sometimes these can
be successful if air is prevented from contacting the coal in the mine.
The theory of water diversion is that water diverted from a mine
will not become polluted."' Pumps, flumes, barrels, and various other
devices are required.
Mine air sealing is a technique which has proved effective for controlling mine drainage. 31 The objective of air sealing is to exclude
oxygen from a mine to prevent the oxidation of pyrites found in the
coal and adjacent strata. The main difficulty with this technique is that
cracks and crevices caused by subsidence are frequently formed and
allow the mine to breathe.
Surface restoration and revegetation are primarily used for controlling acid formation in strip mines and surface refuse piles. 2 By
stripping the coal and reclaiming the surface the pyritic materials are
covered over and oxygen is excluded. A growth of vegetation over: a
spoil pile or refuse bank prevents erosion and the exposure of new
pyritic materials. Also, vegetation will live on. the, oxygen available in
the upper layer of the pile.
Some other techniques still to be researched include active and inert
gas replacement of mine atmospheres (similar to . mine flooding), grouting, inundation by sealing or surface water control, and biological control methods. 3

Deep Well Disposal
Deep well disposal is a relatively new technique that has been contemplated for doing away with acid mine drainage. 4 This would involve treating the water, removing suspended 'solids, and injecting the
liquid wastes into geological formations underground.
Dilution
The effects of acid mine drainage are reduced by dilution in the
receiving stream.5 A disadvantage of this technique is that it only
Martin & Hill, supra note 23, at 52; App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22, at 130.
Moebs, Mine Air Sealing: A Progress Report,. in SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON COAL MINE
DRAINAGE RESEARCH 255 (G. Barthauer chairman 1968); App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra
note 22, at 136.
32. App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22, at 97, 115.
33. Martin & Hill, supra note 23, at 53.
34. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COAL MINE RECLAMATION, supra note 14, at 36; see App. R
,APPALACHIA STUoY, supra note 22, at 90.
35. App. B APPALACHIA STUDY, supra note 22, at 71.
30.
31.
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reduces the problem and does not prevent or eliminate the formation
of acid mine drainage.
From the foregoing, it is clear that effective methods for treating and
controlling mine drainage are available. The big question is, "Who is
.responsible. for such treatment or control?" This question is dealt With
in the remainder of the article.
THE RESPONSE

OF THE LAW TO THE PROBLEM

Common Law
The history of the law's response to coal mine acid drainage in
Pennsylvania8 6 logically starts with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,37 a private nuisance case decided in 1886. In that case acid mine
drainage had the effect of preventing plaintiff, a downstream riparian
landowner, from using water from Meadow Brook, a small tributary
of the Lackawanna River, for domestic purposes or a fountain, she had
earlier constructed. The pipes corroded, the fish in the brook were
killed, and "the entire apparatus for the utilization of the water" was
abandoned.8
A private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with another's use
and enjoyment of real property.8 9 The unreasonableness of the interference depends, under the test outlined in the Restatement of Torts,
on whether the utility of the defendant's conduct outweighs the gravity
of the harm to the plaintiff. 40 The court in Sanderson, emphasizing in
its opinion the value of coal mining to the development of the region,
decided that there was no liability:
The right to mine coal is not a nuisance in itself: It is, as we
have said, a right incident to the ownership of coal property, and
when exercised in the ordinary manner, and with due care the
owner cannot be held for permitting the natural flow of mine
water over his own land, into the water course,
by means of which
41
the natural drainage of the country is effected.
36. From this point on, although (as noted above, text accompanying notes 3-5) the
acid mine drainage problem affects all of northern Appalachia, we will be confining our
analysis solely to Pennsylvania.
37. 113 Pa. 126 (1886).
38. Id. at 143.
39. 6-A AMERICAN. LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 28.22-.34 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954) (Clyde 0.
Martz, author of Private Nuisance Section); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971)
thereinafter cited as PROSSER].
40.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 827-28 (1939).

41.

113 Pa. at 146. Contrast the doctrine in New York espoused in Whalen v. Union
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Sanderson was cited as the law in Pennsylvania with regard to acid
mine drainage, and with regard to the limits of private nuisance law,
for many years. 42 Acid mine drainage as a possible public nuisance was
3
dealt with in 1924 in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co.4
There the discharge of acid mine water into Indian Creek in Westmoreland County, upstream from a reservoir used to supply water to
the locomotives of the Pennsylvania Railroad and as municipal water
supply for several communities with a combined population of 75,000,
was enjoined as a public nuisance. The court distinguished Sanderson
on the ground that:
Such an injury as was shown in the Sanderson case was held to
be unredressable where the public is not involved. The rule there
laid down is in consonance with that applied in many instances,
where a condition is not held to be a nuisance which annoys or
offends a single individual
but which would be outlawed if the
44
public were complaining.
The Sagamore court argued strenuously against the point that a mine
owner has a property right to discharge acid mine water, 45 and attempted to limit Sanderson to holding that the defendant's act in that
case was not a nuisance, because of "the exceptional situation there
4
existing." 6
Case law with respect to acid mine drainage, and water pollution
generally, has long since been overshadowed by Legislative enactments.
The case law is not unimportant, but at this point serves primarily as a
backdrop, as the context, in which statutory provisions must be interpreted.
Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), that there is no balancing of interests
possible even in granting an injunction against a private nuisance-if a wrong is being
committed, it must be enjoined. This doctrine may have been abandoned, with respect to
the granting of an injunction but not with respect to the awarding of damages, in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
42. See, e.g., Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Evans v. Moffat, 192
Pa. Super. 204, 160 A.2d 465 (1960). It is interesting to contrast the Sanderson approach
to acid mine drainage with the Pennsylvania common law approach to mine subsidence.
In Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429 (1870), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the view
that the owner of the surface estate is entitled as an absolute right to support from the
owner of subsurface minerals. In Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875), the court went
so far as to hold that it was no defense that the mining was conducted in accordance
with the custom prevailing in the industry; lack of fault was nearly irrelevant. This has
long since, of course, been substantially modified by statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§§ 67.1-.10 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-.19 (Supp. 1973).
43. 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924).
44. Id. at 247, 126 A. at 391.
45. Id. at 248-50, 126 A. at 391-92.
46. Id. at 249, 126 A. at 391.
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Legislation
The Purity of Waters Act 4T was enacted in 1905 and was the first
legislation in Pennsylvania that pertained to clean streams. The Purity
of Waters Act regulated the discharge of sewage into the Commonwealth's waters but specifically excluded coal mine drainage. 48
In 1923, the Act of June 14, 192349 was enacted by the Pennsylvania
legislature which empowered the Advisory Board of the Department of
Health to promulgate orders and regulations to protect the water supplies from pollution and contamination. As in the case of the Purity of
Waters Act, coal mine drainage was specifically excluded from the
coverage of this legislation although the 1923 Act went further and
excluded water used in the preparation of coal. 50 These two acts remained in effect until 1937 when they were repealed by the original
Clean Streams Law.51
The Clean Streams Law of 1937 was the first major legislative enactment for dealing with water pollution in Pennsylvania. Section 3 of the
Act declared it a public nuisance to discharge sewage, industrial wastes,
or any other noxious or deleterious substances which were or which may
become "inimical and injurious to the public health, or to animal or
aquatic life, or to the uses of such waters for domestic or industrial
consumption, or for recreation." 52 Although the discharge of sewage
and industrial waste was not completely prohibited, such discharges became subject to the administrative regulation of the Sanitary Water
Board. 53

One of the primary concerns of the Pennsylvania legislature in 1937
47. Act of Apr. 22, 1905, Pa. P.L. 260 (repealed 1937).
48. Section 4 of the Purity of Waters Act provided in part:
No person, corporation, or municipality shall place, or permit to be placed, or
discharge, or permit to flow into any of the waters of the State, any sewage, except
as hereinafter provided. But this act shall not apply to waters pumped or flowing
from coal mines ....

Act of Apr. 22, 1905, § 4, Pa. P.L. 260 (repealed 1937) (emphasis added).
49. Pa. P.L. 793 (repealed 1937).
50. Section 1 of the 1923 Act provided in part:
And further provided: That this Act shall not apply to any pollution or contamination caused by or resulting from water pumped or flowing from coal mines or water
used in the preparation of coal.
Act of June 14, 1923, § 1, Pa. P.L. 793 (repealed 1937).
51. Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1.1001 (Supp. 1973).
52. Act of June 22, 1937, § 3,Pa. P.L. 1989, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.3
(Supp. 1973).
53. Act of June 22, 1937, §§ 201-02, 301-02, Pa. P.L. 1989-90, 1994-95, as amended, PA
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.201-.202, 691.301 (Supp. 1973).
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was to protect the "clean waters" of the Commonwealth from pollution
54
by,sewage or industrial wastes.

The discharge of acid mine drainage was not included in the definition of industrial waste in section 1of the Act 55 and, once again, was
specifically excluded from regulation in section 310.56 The General
Assembly recognized in section 310 that there was no known practical
means for removing the polluting properties produced by coal mine
drainage:
Acid Mine Drainage and Silt.-The provisions of this article shall
not apply to acid mine drainageand silt from coal mines until such
time as, in the opinion of the Sanitary Water Board, practical
means for the removal
of polluting properties of such drainage
57
shall become known.

It was not until 1945, when the Clean Streams Law was amended, 8
that coal mine drainage became subject to legislative proscription.
Section 310 of the 1937 Act was amended to regulate the discharge of
mine drainage into the "clean waters" of the Commonwealth. That
section of the 1945 amendments specifically allowed the discharge of
acid mine drainage into "clean waters" of the Commonwealth which
were not devoted to public use and into waters of the Commonwealth
which were already polluted. 9 The 1945 amendments prohibited only
the discharge of acid mine drainage into "clean waters" of the Commonwealth which were devoted or put to public use.
In addition, three new sections, sections 311, 312 and 313, were added
to the Clean Streams Law in 1945.60 Section 311 authorized the Sanitary Water Board to acquire easements and rights of ways by condemnation, purchase or otherwise, 61 for the purpose of transporting or
diverting discharges of acid mine drainage into already polluted or un54. Section 306 of the Clean Streams Law defined "clean waters" as:
[W]aters which are, at the effective date of this Act, unpolluted and free from any
discharge or drainage of industrial waste and from any authorized discharge or
drainage of sewage ....
Act of June 22, 1937, § 306, Pa. P.L. 1996 (repealed 1970).
55. "Industrial waste" was defined to include "any liquid, gaseous or solid substance,
not sewage, resulting from any manufacturing or industry." Act of June 22, 1937, § 1,
Pa. P.L. 1988, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. -tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1973).
56. Act of June 22, 1937, § 310, Pa. P.L. 1998 (repealed 1965).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Act of May 8, 1945, Pa. P.L. 435, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001,
amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
59. Act of May 8, 1945, § 6, Pa. P.L. 439, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 310, Pa.
P.L. 1998 (repealed 1965).
60. Act of May 8, 1945, § 7, Pa. P.L. 440-43 (repealed 1965).
61. Id.
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clean waters, and section 312 set forth the condemnation procedures to
be followed. 62 The most significant amendment was section 313 which
required that a mine operator submit a drainage plan to and obtain a
permit from the Sanitary Water Board before a coal mine could be
opened, reopened, or continued in operation.6 Thus, a mine operator
was %requiredto plan acid mine drainage control before and implement
such measures while he mined.
The 1945 amendments to the Clean Streams Law clearly indicate
that the Pennsylvania legislature still recognized the special. problems
of acid mine drainage confronting the coal mining industry and continued to permit the discharge of acid mine drainage into certain
waters of the Commonwealth. No attempt was made by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1945 to clean up any previously polluted waters.
The legislative purpose at that time was to protect waters which were
"clean waters" on or subsequent to January 1, 1944. To accomplish
this objective, the legislature in section 311 placed on the Commonwealth the cost of the acquisition of easements and rights of ways and
the equipment necessary to transport and divert acid mine water from
0 4
clean waters to already polluted or unclean streams.
In 1965 new amendments were enacted to the Clean Streams Law
which represented a significant departure from the previous legislation.6 5 A new provision, Section 4, was added which set forth the findings and declarations of policy of the General Assembly.
Findings and Declarations of Policy.-It is hereby determined by
the General Assembly of Pennsylvania and declared as a matter
of legislative findings that:
(1) The Clean Streams Law as presently written has failed
to prevent an increase in the miles of polluted water in Pennsylvania.
(2) The present Clean Streams Law contains special provisions
for mine drainage that discriminate-against the public interest.
(3) Mine drainage is the major cause of stream pollution in
Pennsylvania and is doing immense damage to the waters of the
Commonwealth.
(4) Pennsylvania, having more miles of water polluted by mine
drainage than any state in the nation, has an intolerable situation
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
:65. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, Pa. P.L. 372, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
.1001 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.

§§

691.1-
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which seriously jeopardized the economic future of the Commonwealth.
(5) Clean, unpolluted streams are absolutely essential if Pennsylvania is to attract new manufacturing industries and to develop
Pennsylvania's full share of the tourist industry, and
(6) Clean, unpolluted water is absolutely essential if Pennsylvanians are to have adequate out of door recreational facilities
in the decades ahead.
The General Assembly of Pennsylvania therefore declares it
to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that:
(1) It is the objective of the Clean Streams Law not only to
prevent further pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth,
but also to reclaim and restore to a clean, unpolluted condition
every stream in Pennsylvania that is presently polluted, and
(2) The prevention and the elimination of water pollution is
directly related to the economic future of the
recognized as being
Commonwealth.6"
Thus, the General Assembly confessed that coal mine drainage had
received special treatment in the past and announced that the new
policy of the Commonwealth was not only to prevent further stream
pollution, but also to restore every polluted stream in Pennsylvania to
a clean and unpolluted condition.
To help accomplish that objective, the 1965 Act brought acid mine
drainage within the definition of industrial waste.6 7 As a result, discharges of acid mine drainage became subject to section 307 of the
Clean Streams Law. Section 307 provided in part:
No person shall hereafter .. .operate any establishment, which,

in its operation, results in a discharge of industrial waste which
would flow or be discharged into any of the waters of the Commonwealth and thereby cause the pollution of the same .... 68
66. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 2, Pa. P.L. 374, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.4
(Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987 (emphasis added).
67. Section 1 of the Clean Streams Law as amended in 1965 defined industrial waste
as follows:
"Industrial waste" shall be construed to meanany liquid, gaseous or solid substance,
not sewage, resulting from any manufacturing or industry, or from any establishment, as herein defined, and mine drainage, silt, coal mine solids, rock, debris, dirt
and clay from coal mines, coal collieries, breakers or other coal processing operations.
Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 1, Pa. P.L. 374, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp.
1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 1, Pa. P.L. 1988 (emphasis added).
68. Act of June 22, 1937, § 307, Pa. P.L. 1996, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.307 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). Section 307 of the 1937 Act was not changed by
the 1965 amendments but remained in the form in which it was originally enacted in
1937.
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Thus, for the first time, the discharge of acid mine drainage into
already polluted waters was prohibited in Pennsylvania.
Another important amendment to the Clean Streams Law in 1965
was the addition of section 315.69 This section required that permits
be obtained from the Sanitary Water Board before a coal mine could
be opened, reopened, or continued in operation. More specifically,
section 315(a) required that an application for a permit approving the
proposed plan for drainage and industrial waste be filed with the
Sanitary Water Board; section 315(b) made it unlawful to open, reopen,
or continue the operation of any coal mine without a permit and also
set forth the conditions and circumstances upon which permits were
to be issued by the Sanitary Water Board; and section 315(c) provided
certain circumstances under which the Sanitary Water Board could
70
modify, suspend or revoke any permit which had been issued.
The 1965 amendments to the Clean Streams Law are still in effect,
except as they were amended by the Pennsylvania legislature in July
1970.71

The 1970 amendments to the Clean Streams Law include a number
of important changes. The amended versions of sections 307 and 315
give the Sanitary Water Board greater control over the discharge of
industrial wastes and mine operations and make it a nuisance to discharge any mine drainage or industrial waste or to operate any mine
without a permit or contrary to the terms of the Sanitary Water
72
Board.
Most significantly, however, the legislature clearly spelled out in
the 1970 amended version of section 315 what it meant by operation
of a mine and discharge from a mine.
Operation of a mine includes "any preparatory work in connection
with opening or reopening a mine, backfilling, sealing, and other closing procedures and any73 other work done on land or water in connection with the mine."
Discharge from a mine includes, with one limitation, a discharge
which occurs after mining operations have ceased.7 4 The limitation is
69. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315
(Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
70. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.315
(a)-(c) (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937,
Pa. P.L. 1987.
72. Id. §§ 691.307, 691.315, amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
73. Id. § 691.315(a), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
74. Id.
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that the mining Operations must have been conducted subsequent to
January 1, 1966, under circumstances which required a permit from the
Sanitary Water Board under the provisions of section 315(b) of the
Clean Streams Law as it' existed under the 1965 amendments. This
proviso leaves no doubt that mine operators now must insure that no
polluting discharge will occur after mining operations have ceased.
The 1970 amendments to the Clean Streams Law also provide flexibility in the legal remedies available to the .enforcement agency. They
make one who violates any of its provisions or any rule or regulation of
the Sanitary Water B6ard 8 subject to civil and criminal penalties as
well as various other enforcement remedies. Under section 601,7
an injunction may be issued where the public health is endangered
or where the circumstances require it. Section 60277 provides that any
person who violates any provision of the Clean Streams Law or any
rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to the Act shall be fined
not less than $100 nor-more than $1000 for each separate offense and
may be imprisoned for sixty days. And, any person who commits a
second offense within two years shall be fined not less than $100 nor
more than $5,000 for each separate offense and may also be imprisoned
for not more than one year. Each day of continued violation is a
separate offense. A violator may also be assessed a civil penalty up to
$10,000 under section 60578 or may have his permit revoked, modified,
or suspended under section 610.79 In addition, an applicant may be
refused a permit under section 60980 if he is found to be in violation
of any provision of the Clean Streams Law or any administrative rule
or regulation and if such violation "demonstrates: a lack of ability or
intention on the part of the applicant to comply with the law or
with the conditions of the permit sought."8'
75. The Department of Natural Resources was established in Pennsylvania in 1971 by
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 158 (Supp. 1973). This department assumed the functions which
were previously exercised by the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries and the
Sanitary Water Board.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 601,
Pa. P.L. 2000.
77. Id. § 691.602, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 602, Pa. PL. 2000.
78. Id. § 691.605, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 605, Pa. P.L. 2001.
79. Id. § 691.610, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 610, Pa. P.L. 1987.
80. Id. § 691.609, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 609, Pa. P.L. 2002.
81. The enactment of section 609 with its grant of authority to withhold a permit was
sparked by a lower court decision in Sanitary Water Board v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 47 Pa.
D. & C.2d 378 (C.P. Dauph. Co. 1969). The court in that case reversed an order of the
Sanitary Water Board refusing to issue a permit to an applicant because of alleged viola-

tions of mine permits that had been previously issued to the applicant for other coal
mines. The Clean Streams Law in effect at that time did not provide that existing violations could be the basis for refusing to issue a permit.
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•"Another important addition to the Clean Streams Law in 1970 was
the bonding requirements. An operator holding a permit or an,applicant seeking a permit can be required under section 315(b) to post a
bond which would insure compliance with the law, rules or regulations,
and the provisions and conditions of a permit.8 2 The General Assembly
was particularly seeking to insure that there will be no polluting discharge after mining operations have ceased. The Department is given
authority to establish the amount of bond, and liability under any
bond is to continue "until such time as the department determines
that there is no further significant risk of a pollutional discharge."83
If an operator refuses to post bond, the Department may withhold
the issuance of a permit or revoke an existing permit.
A "Clean Water Fund" to be used in the elimination of pollution
also was established by the Pennsylvania legislature when the Clean
Streams Law was amended in 1970.84 The Department of Health was

authorized to accept payments into the fund in lieu of requiring the
holder of a permit to construct or operate a treatment facility. The
payments received into the fund are to be used for abatement programs
or the construction of consolidated treatment plants. Presumably, this
,latter provision was enacted to cope with the problems of small operators who cannot afford to build treatment facilities; or perhaps in some
cases to provide an institutional mechanism for constructing joint or
consolidated treatment facilities.
Mine operators are not the only ones responsible under the Clean
Streams Law for preventing stream pollution from mine drainage.
Section 316, in addition to giving the mine operator or the Commonwealth access to lands which cause or may cause pollution, imposes
liability on the landowner or occupier of such lands. 5 This provision
is intended to deal with pollution resulting from abandoned and
inactive mines and refuse piles. The constitutionality of section 316
can be challenged inasmuch as a landowner or occupier may not have
had any responsibility for conditions created by mining operations
that took place before the enactment of this provision in 1970.
From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that Pennsylvania
has a comprehensive Clean Streams Law for dealing with the problems
§

82.
315,
83.
84.
85.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315(b) (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937,
Pa. P;L. 1987.
Id.
Id. § 691.8, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 8, Pa. P.L. 1987.
Id. § 691.316, amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 316, Pa. P.L. 1987.
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of acid mine drainage and stream pollution. Four other enactments
by the General Assembly also are relevant to the mine drainage problem.
The Coal Mine Sealing Act of 19476 was a statutory response by the
legislature to protect the waters of the Commonwealth from acid mine
drainage from abandoned mines. This Act requires that coal mining
operators, upon abandonment of a mining operation, seal all openings
in the mine through which water may flow into streams of the Commonwealth and through which air may enter the mine.8 7 Once a mine
is sealed, the Commonwealth accepts the responsibility for the maintenance of the seals.88
Shortly after the Clean Streams Law was amended in 1965, the General
Assembly enacted the Act of December 15, 196589 as an additional
measure to alleviate the pollution of streams from mine drainage.
This Act was aimed at abandoned mines and directed the Secretary of
the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries to "initiate an immediate action program to correct pollution from abandoned deep and
strip mines on each of the watersheds of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." 90 Although this Act may appear to indicate a legislative
intent to make the Commonwealth responsible for drainage from
abandoned and non-operating mines the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has, in Harmar and Pittsburgh, held that an operator must
treat water which flows into his mine from an adjacent abandoned
mine and which he pumps as part of his mining operation.9 1
On January 19, 1968, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Land
and Water Conservation and Reclamation Act.9 2 This Act was designed
to alleviate the predicament of small mine operators or owners who
could not afford to build treatment facilities of their own by helping
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 28.1-.8 (1966).
87. Act of June 30, 1947, § 3(a), Pa. P.L. 1178, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 28.3(a) (1966).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 28.5 (1966).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 760.1-.2 (Supp. 1973).
90. Id. § 760.1 (emphasis added).
91. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 23-24 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5101-21 (Supp. 1973). This act was the enabling legislation for the 1967 amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania which provided for the
creation of a debt and the issuance of bonds in the amount of $500,000,000.00. This money
was to be used:
... for a Land and Water Conservation and Reclamation Fund to be used for the
conservation and reclamation of land and water resources of the Commonwealth,
including the elimination of acid mine drainage . .. and other pollution from the
streams of the Commonwealth ....
Id. § 5104 (emphasis added).
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to provide treatment plants for them. The Act gave the Department
of Mines and Mineral Industries the power and authority to build and
operate treatment plants and to permit operators and owners to discharge their mine drainage into these plants. The operators and owners
are to be charged according to the quantity and quality of their pollutants as well as a proportional share of the capital and operating
costs. 93

In 1968, the legislature enacted the Coal Refuse Disposal Control
Act 94 to deal with a wide range of conditions created by coal refuse

disposal piles. This Act recognized that such disposal piles can cause
water pollution, and it gave the Department of Mines and Mineral
Industries broad powers of control over coal refuse piles to prevent
water pollution and various other effects.
and PITrSBURGH
In the Pittsburgh Coal case the Pittsburgh Coal Co. Division of
Consolidation Coal Co. sought, on June 28, 1968, a permit from the
Department of Health, 95 then the administrative agency responsible
for enforcing the provisions of the Clean Streams Law, 96 to discharge
acid mine drainage from its Hutchinson Mine.
The Hutchinson Mine is a bituminous coal mine which is located
in a large underground coal basin in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, known as the Irwin Basin. 97 This basin is approximately
twenty-one miles long and seven miles wide. It is parabolic or dishshaped and dips from the north to the south. The Hutchinson Mine
is situated at the southern tip of the Irwin Basin, at approximately
the lowest point in the dip.98
The Irwin Basin is completely mined out except for the unmined
coal in the Hutchinson Mine. The eighteen major coal mines which
have operated in this basin at various times since 1852 are now closed
and abandoned. Pittsburgh Coal Co. was never involved in any of
HARMAR

those other operations.99
A large underground lake or pool, covering 23,780 acres and esti93. Id. §§ 5116(a)(L)-(II).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 30.1-.62 (Supp. 1973).
95. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 415, 286 A.2d at 461.
96. Act of June 22, 1937, § 5, Pa. P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§
691.5(c)-(d) (Supp. 1973).
97. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 409-11, 286 A.2d at 461-62.
98.

Id.

99.

Id.
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mated to contain from 100 to 350 billion gallons of polluted water, has
formed in the Irwin Basin as a result of ground water accumulating
00
in the abandoned mine.
; The. Hutchinson Mine is separated from the adjacent abandoned
mines in the Irwin Basin by a barrier-pillar of coal over 100 feet in
thickness which acts as a dam to keep water in the pool from flowing
into the mine. Approximately 2.17 million gallons of water per day
flow over and around and through this barrier-pillar into the Hutchinson Mine. 0 1
Pittsburgh Coal Co. is presently pumping approximately 3.44 million
gallons of water per day from the Hutchinson Mine. This amount
includes the 2.17 million gallons flowing from the abandoned mines
which must be pumped in order to-mine the coal in the Hutchinson
02
Mine
The Department of Health on January 15, 1969 denied a permit on
the grounds that Pittsburgh Coal Co. proposed to treat only the 1.27
million gallons per. day that originated in the Hutchinson Mine itself. 0 3 An appeal to the Sanitary Water Board followed, and after
hearings that Board-affirmed the action of the Department. 0 4
On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed, holding (a) the Clean
Streams Law does not require the treatment of acid mine drainage
from inactive mines under the circumstances of this case; 05 (b) if it
did, it would be unconstitutional as "an unreasonable, arbitrary, and
oppressive exercise of the police power,"' 06 and a denial of due process,
in that it imposed on appellant a burden not of its own making and
"unrelated to its otherwise lawful operation over the years,"' 0 7 and
in that there was no "rational relationship between the evil sought
to be cured and the use of property as contributing to that evil"; 108
and (c) that the Department of Health had issued and the Sanitary
Water Board adopted "Guidelines" which were contrary at least to
the spirit of the Board's ruling in this case. 0 9
100.

Id.

* 101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Brief for Appellant on appeal from Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board
at 4, Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil No. 90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
104. The Sanitary Water Board's opinion is summarized in the commonwealth court's
opinion, 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 416-18, 286 A.2d at 464-65.
105. Id. at 421-23, 286 A.2d at 467.
106. Id. at 423, 286 A.2d at 468.
107. Id. at 424, 286 A.2d at 468.
108.

Id.

109.

Id. at 420, 286 A.2d at 465; see id. at 428, 286 A.2d at 469 (Mencer, J., dissenting).
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The Harmar Coal case also dealt with the question of the extent
to which a mine operator should be responsible under the Clean
Streams Law for the treatment of waters from an adjacent inactive mine
which the operator pumps to protect his own -active operations.
That case involved the company's Harmar Mine, in Allegheny
County, which is immediately adjacent to an abandoned mine known
as the Indianola Mine." 0 The Indianola Mine was abandoned in 1957
and an accumulation of water began forming in the mine behind the
barrier-pillar of coal which separated that mine from the Harmar
Mine. The Department of Mines and Mineral Industries considered
the possible build-up of hydrostatic pressure accumulating adjacent to
the barrier-pillar to be a threat to the safety of the miners in the
Harmar Mine. Therefore, that department required the Harmar Coal
Co. to pump the water from the Indianola Mine. The company began
doing this in 1958 under a permit it obtained from the Department
of Health."' The water was discharged into Deer Creek. When the
Clean Streams. Law was amended in 1965, Harmar Coal Co. was
required to submit an application for a mine drainage permit. In that
application Harmar Coal Co. sought permission to pump 6.48 million
gallons of mine drainage per day from the inactive Indianola Mine and
to discharge it without treatment into Deer Creek. The Sanitary Water
Board refused the application and ordered that the Harmar Mine
operations be ceased. 112 The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
8
County reversed the Board."
The commonwealth court affirmed the decision of the Dauphin
County court on the basis that (a) the Sanitary Water Board did not
offer substantial evidence that the pumping of mine water from the
Indianola Mine into Deer Creek would increase the Base Waste Load; 1 4
(b) there was no substantial evidence-specifically, no aquatic studyto support the need for the effluent standards in question as they related
to iron content;" 5 (c) the Clean Streams Law did not require treat110. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 437-38, 285 A.2d at 899.
111. Id., 285 A.2d at 900.
112. Id. at 438-39, 285 A.2d at 900.
113. Sanitary Water Bd. v. Harmar Coal Co., 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 627 (C.P. Dauph. Co.
1970). The majority in the commonwealth court adopted the opinion of the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas, which had been written by Judge Wilkinson of the
commonwealth court, specially assigned, along with Judge Manderino, to the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas for the Harmar Coal case. Neither Judge Wilkinson nor
Judge Manderino participated at the commonwealth court level; Justice Manderino did
not participate at the supreme court level.
114. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 441,285 A.2d at 901.
115. Id. at 442, 285 A.2d at 902.
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ment of mine drainage other than from the mine being worked;" 16 and
11 7
(d) if it did, it would be unconstitutional.
Base Waste Load is a term peculiar to the Department of Health,
defined in the Guidelines published by the Department as follows:
[T]he normal waste load originating without pumping or change
in drainage pattern from one or more inactive mines as determined by the Board."18
The Department of Health Guidelines in effect at that time, which
the commonwealth court held were binding on the Board, also provided:
The operator(s) will be required to meet Board requirements for
drainage from his active mine as well as the pollutional increment
in excess of the estimated Base Waste Load resulting from changes
in the drainagepattern in the inactive mine. The maximum limi-

tation would be the Base Waste Load or the standards set by the
Board, whichever is higher." 9
Under these guidelines, if a mine operator's pumping of wastes from
an adjacent inactive mine did not increase the Base Waste Load, he
was not required to treat it. The commonwealth court held that the
20
Board did not prove that the Base Waste Load would be increased.
This, in essence, disposed of the second issue as well. If the mine
drainage from the Indianola Mine was going to flow into Deer Creek
whether or not it was pumped, then no excess pollution was being created by Harmar Coal Co.'s pumping it there.
The commonwealth court's holdings on these two issues raised some
interesting questions relative to who has the burden of proof in an
environmental case where an administrative agency denies a permit.
Must the applicant prove it will not cause pollution, or must the agency
prove it will? Furthermore, what is needed to satisfy that burden of
proof? The supreme court disposed of the first issue by stating that
there was substantial evidence-thus not really saying who had the
burden of proof initially, but implicitly requiring that the agency's
ultimate conclusion be supported by substantial evidence. 12' On the
116. Id. at 441-42, 285 A.2d at 902.
117. Id. at 442 n.**. The court seemed to adopt the reasoning it espoused in Pittsburgh Coal, see notes 106-08 supra.
118. Pennsylvania Department of Health, Guidelines Regarding Mining in Areas
Allected by Inactive Workings, in MINE DRAINAGE MANUAL IV-1 n.0 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited Guidelines].
119. Id. at IV-1 (emphasis added); see note 194 infra for quotation in full.
120. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 19 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
121. As required by section 44 of the Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945,
Pa. P.L. 1388, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962).
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aquatic study issue, the court in essence held that as long as there
was evidence to support a particular standard, the court would bow
122
to the expertise of the Sanitary Water Board.
The significance of the commonwealth court's decisions in Pittsburgh Coal and Harmar Coal is that in applying these decisions, under
no circumstance would a mine operator have been required to treat
mine drainage that was not from his mine, even if his mining operations resulted in a substantially greater discharge to a surface stream.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on all issues, holding:
(a) The Clean Streams Law is applicable to a discharge of acid mine
drainage from inactive as well as active mines on the facts of these
two cases. 12 (b) As so applied, the Clean Streams Law is constitutional. 2 4 (c) The Guidelines were not regulations, and the Sanitary
Water Board was not bound by them.125 (d) There was substantial
evidence to support the Sanitary Water Board's findings in Harmar
Coal.28 (e) Aquatic studies are not necessary on each and every stream
1 27
for which water quality standards are promulgated.
Scope of the Clean Streams Law
The basic approach of the commonwealth court and the supreme
court is enlightening. The commonwealth court, reading the all inclusive definition of "waters of the Commonwealth' ' 128 from the statute,

interpreted that phrase as applying to underground waters in a mine,
or abandoned mine,1 29 as well as to surface waters. It therefore stated
the issue as follows:
122. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 23 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973); see
text accompanying notes 206-09 infra
123. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 10-11 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 20.
126. Id. at 21.
127. Id. at 22.
128. Section 1 of the Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987, as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1973), defines "waters of the Commonwealth" as follows:
"Waters of the Commonwealth" shall be construed to include any and all rivers,
streams, creeks, rivulets, impoundments, ditches, water courses, storm sewers, lakes,
dammed water, ponds, springs and all other bodies or channels of conveyance of surface and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or artificial, within
or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth.
129. The commonwealth court found that "inactive mines" were distinguished in the
Clean Streams Law, and in other legislation, from "active mines," that "inactive mines"
were not "mines" under the Clean Streams Law, and therefore the acid mine drainage
provisions of the Clean Streams Law did not apply to inactive mines. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at
421-22, 286 A.2d at 466-67. The supreme court concluded that "inactive mines" were
"mines" under the Clean Streams Law. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90
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It is the unusual factual situation of this conflict which sets it.
apart from the clearly enunciated position of the statutory and
regulatory law heretofore stated. In this case, "waters of the Commonwealth" contained in a man-made underground lake, and naturally contaminated while therein, are naturally flowing through
man-made caverns, not constructed by appellant, onto appellant's
land. Appellant seeks to divert this water into a natural, surface
body of "water of the Commonwealth," to be able to regain the
use and enjoyment of his land. It is the diversion of the Commonwealth's waters from one channel to another which inspires the
Board to disallow absent treatment of the diverted water. Clearly,
then, this case is.not the usual case involving the discharge of acid
mine drainage resulting from that applicant's mining operations.
We must be careful to consider
the statutory provisions and the
80
Board's holding in this light.
'The supreme court refused to accept this statement of the issue
primarily because it insisted on distinguishing between polluted water
that remained in a mine, and water that was discharged into a-stream.
Water polluted underground can itself pollute the surface water
into which it is discharged. Nothing in the Clean Streams Law
justified the Court's holding that pollution occurs only when
polluting substances are "first discharged into any 'waters of the
Commonwealth,'" in this case the underground pool. Appellant
argues, and we agree, that the critical and principal illegal conduct
under the Clean Streams Law is the discharge into the surface
waters. The Court below, failed to distinguish between pollution
of waters, created by mining, which remain underground andthose waters which are discharged to the surface. In the Clean
Streams Law and the Rules and Regulations thereunder this distinction is crystal clear.' 3 ' Section 315 of the 1965 Amendments
states that a permit would not be issued if in the Board's opinion
the discharge from the mine would endanger the "public health,
animal or aquatic life, or ... the use of the water for domestic or
industrial consumption or recreation." In the 1970 Amendments
this language was deleted. Section 315 now prohibits discharges
(Pa., Mar. 16, 1973). In terms of the wording of the statutes, reasonable men could
probably differ on this. In terms of the policy reasons for selecting one or the other interpretation, it probably depends on just how much of an evil one thinks the legislature felt
acid mine drainage to be. If one concludes the legislature was feeling its way in 1965, only
tentatively and partially overruling the outlook of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 126 (1886) (see text accompanying notes 41-42 supra), then the commonwealth court
was right. The supreme court seems to have concluded that the legislature had decided
firmly that the problem must be solved, as soon as possible. That outlook, as we will be
suggesting in connection with a number of issues, explains much about the Harmar and
Pittsburgh decision, and suggests much about future decisions.
130. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 418-19, 286 A.2d at 465-66 (footnote omitted).
131. It is difficult to avoid wondering whether a pun was intended here.
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from mines unless the discharge is authorized by the Board's Rules
and Regulations or the mine operator has first obtained a permit.
Section 4, Article 900 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, by
requiring plans or methods to "show how a' p0llutibnal discharge
will be prevented from the mine after mining is completed,"
anticipates and allows the accumulation of polluted13 2water in mine
basins as long as it does not reach the surface waters.
In a sense this harks back to the Sagamore distinction.1 18 Polluted water
that is not put to any public use is not a public nuisance. It may, under
some circumstances, be a violation of the Clean Streams Law to pollute
waters that are not being put to a public use, as for example in the
"potential pollution" provision added by the 1970 amendments.13 4
Even that, however, falls back for its justification on a potentiality for
discharge into some stream used by the public. The purpose of the
Clean Streams Law even after Harmar and Pittsburgh, is not simply
to protect water, 3 5 it is to protect the public. Thus there is a basis
for failing to regulate pollution of underground "waters of the Commonwealth" that will not reach the surface, while nevertheless regulating the discharge of that same water.
Once having restated the issue, of course, the answer always falls
neatly into place. The only other subsidiary issue regarding whether
or not Harmar Coal Co. and Pittsburgh Coal Co. were required by the
Clean Streams Law to treat their respective "extra" discharges was
whether, under that law, the discharges from adjacent inactive mines
were their responsibility.
The supreme court construed the Clean Streams Law broadly, citing the "Environmental Declaration of Rights"'186 to support the proposition that there is "an overriding public interest in acid mine drainage control,"'13 7 and noted that:
132. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 11 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
133. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924); see text
accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
134.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.402 (Supp. 1973).

135. Even though that might be desirable, in the abstract. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Stone, Should Trees Have
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 450 (1972).
Standing?-Toward
136. Commonwealth
v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 16 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
Article 1, section 27 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides:
Section 27. Natural Resources and the Public Estate.-The people have a right to
clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's natural resources, including the
air, waters, fish, wildlife, and the public lands and property of the Commonwealth,
are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall preserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all the people.
137. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 16 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
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Section 315, as amended, provides that no one "shall operate a
mine or allow a discharge from a mine" without a permit or
contrary to the Board's rules and regulations: included in "operation of the mine" is "any other work done on land or water in
connection with the mine."'' 8
The court went on, in essence, to hold that any acid mine water discharge that occurs in connection with or because of the activity of a
present mining operation can be regulated or prohibited under the
Clean Streams Law. The conclusion seems to be that a mining company
can be required to treat any discharge that would be caused by its
mining operation. To determine what is caused by a particular mining
operation one looks, under this decision, to the traditional tort law
test: 139 "but for" this particular mining operation, would a given discharge occur?
Constitutionality
Having decided that the commonwealth court had misinterpreted
the Clean Streams Law and that these companies would have to conform their activities to meet the standards promulgated by the Sanitary
Water Board, the supreme court was compelled to determine whether
or not the Clean Streams Law was a valid exercise of the police power,
i.e., whether the law as so interpreted was constitutional. In Pittsburgh Coal the commonwealth court concluded that the Board's interpretation of the Clean Streams Law "constitutes an unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive exercise of the police power . . . [because]
it imposes upon appellant a burden unrelated to its otherwise lawful
operation over the years and not of its making."' 140 This conclusion was
not shared by the supreme court, which proceeded to analyze, independently, the police power and its application in these circumstances.
To lay a foundation for considering the court's analysis of the constitutionality of the Clean Streams Law as applied in these cases it is
appropriate to examine briefly the nature of the police power generally.
The term "police power" is used to describe that authority by which
a state legislates in the public "good." The police power is inherent
138. Id. at 11.
159. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 236-41.
140. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 423-24, 286 A.2d at 486. In Harmar Coal the commonwealth
adopting that
court made a footnote reference to its Pittsburgh Coal decision, apparently
*.
reasoning and conclusion. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 442 n.**, 285 A.2d at 902 n.*
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in state governments'4 1 and is said to be one of the least limitable of
governmental powers. 42 Traditionally, the police power has been employed to regulate in furtherance of the public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare, but a precise definition of the scope of power is
44
almost impossible,'143 other than by a list of examples.1
A proper exercise of the police power must meet three requirements. 45 First, the end sought to be achieved must be one which the
law deems sufficient to justify protection. 4 6 Historically public health,
morals, and safety have been most readily accepted as valid exercises
of the power. 47 Second, the regulation must bear a reasonable relationship to the end sought to be achieved. 14 8 However, the courts have
given legislatures wide latitude to determine the kinds of regulations
which will achieve a desired result. 49 The third requirement, and the
one which presents the most difficulty, is the requirement that the
exercise of the police power not be "arbitrary" or "unreasonable."
The requirement of "reasonableness" or non-arbitrariness stems from
the "due process" and "taking without just compensation" clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
No test has been formulated to determine either criteria. The United
States Supreme Court has addressed itself to this problem on several
occasions. In Nebbia v. New York, the Court said:
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity and the
Fourteenth, as respects State action, do not prohibit governmental
141. But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than
the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to
establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to
regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power;
that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within
the limits of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates ....
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847) (Taney, C.J.) (License Cases).
142. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); District of Columbia v.
Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909).
143. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
144. E.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
145. Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REv. 261 (1971).
146. Id.
147. Id.; Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Bacon v. Walker, 204
U.S. 311 (1907).
148. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934). In Adams v. Shannon, 7 Cal. App. 3d 427, 434, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1970), the
California Court of Appeals said:
In the case of an exercise of the state police power in a fashion designed to protect
the natural environment, the test is . . . whether the legislative body could have
determined upon any reasonable basis that the legislation is necessary or desirable
for its intended purposes.
149. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 71 (1915); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
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regulationfor the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion ofthe admitted power, by securing that the end shall be ac-.
complished by methods consistent with due process. And the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable,arbitrary or capricious, and that
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation valid for
one sort of business, may be invalid for another sort, or for the
same business under other circumstances because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon .the relevant facts.
The court has repeatedly sustained curtailment of enjoyment
of private property, in the public interest.'5 0
There are, apparently, three theories employed by the courts to
evaluate a factual situation to determine the constitutionality of the
imposed regulation.' 5 ' First, if a state appropriates property by taking
title or possession for public benefit, there seems little doubt that this
15 2
is an unreasonable exercise of the power and requires compensation.
Since "title" to property consists ultimately of the right to use the
property in various ways, the prohibition of a sufficient number of
uses also, logically, amounts to a taking. 5 3 Second, the "noxious use
theory" indicates that no compensation is required when the police
power is used to destroy or prohibit activities that are noxious, wrongful, or harmful. 154 This might also be referred to as. the "public nuisance" theory, since property that is a public nuisance can be destroyed
or confiscated without payment. 55 Where this is applied to an already
existing enterprise, one sometimes finds reference to the "creation of
the harm" test, based on the argument that while in general established
economic interests cannot be diminished merely because of a resulting
public benefit, that rule does not apply where the individual whose
interest is to be diminished himself created the need for public regu150. 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S.
149 (1952) ("No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts."); Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962) (again expressed the indecisiveness of the line between valid regulation
and takings: "There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins.").
151. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Sax].
152. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Joint Meeting v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136,
173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
153. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951) (property
was zoned for park (open space) purposes, effectively prohibiting any use at all).
154. Sax, supra note 151; see Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
155. Id.
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lation of his conduct.1 6 Third is the diminution in value theory announced by Justice Holmes in the early part of this 'century in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon1.'7 To Holmes the basic consideration in
each instance was the extent to which the property involved lost its
economic value:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent
of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most
if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon
the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment
of the legislature but it always is open to interested parties to
contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional
power.
To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it..58
While this approach seems to indicate that the degree of loss may be
controlling the Court has not followed Holmes with any degree of
consistency. 159 Later decisions by the Court have distinguished between
the relative economic Values involved and the intrinsic value of the
property remaining if the regulation in question was upheld. In responding to Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Justice Brandeis
said:
It is said that one fact for consideration in determining whether
the limits of the police power have been exceeded is the extent
of the resulting diminution in value, and that here the restriction
destroys existing -rights of property and contract. But values are

relative. If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place
by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all
156. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 71 (1915). See also Butchers' Benevolent
Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. 36 (1878)
(Slaughter House Cases).
157. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
158. Id. at 413-15.
159. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% loss in
value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87 % loss in value).
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other parts of the land. That is, with the value160 not of the coal
alone, but with the value of the whole property.
There have been instances where the diminution in value is so great
that it would seem to cry out for compensation.' 6' Holmes himself
rarely found that the regulation involved went beyond the permissible
limits; even in those instances where he thought the regulation in question "went to the verge of the law."'' 62
To understand the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
the two cases under discussion it is helpful to look at the factors considered by the United States Supreme Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,6 3 cited by the court, 64 and the most recent case where the
Court gave full consideration to the question of when a regulation
is, or is not, a valid exercise of the police power. In Goldblatt the
Town of Hempstead passed an ordinance prohibiting the excavation of
sand and gravel lower than two feet from the top of the underground
water level. Goldblatt owned and for 27 years prior to the promulgating of the ordinance had mined a sand and gravel pit which was
below the water table level and, consequently, had caused a lake to
form. The ordinance would have required Goldblatt to cease his mining (dredging) operations and "backfill" the pit to two feet above the
water table level. This would have forced the shut-down of the mining
operation and reduced the value of the property from commercial to
residential. 16 5
In considering the constitutionality of the ordinance the United
States Supreme Court directed its attention to all three theories. Speaking for the Court Justice Clark started with a hint at the "title" theory:
If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police
powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial
use does not render it unconstitutional. 66
He followed this with a statement of public nuisance, or noxious use
theory:
160. 260 U.S. at 419.
161. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of cedar trees to preserve nearby
apple orchard).
162. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Erie R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'rs, 254
U.S. 394 (1921).
163. 369 U.S. 590 (1961).
164. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 15 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
165. 369 U.S. at 591-92.
166. Id. at 592. This is designated "title theory" on the basis described in the text
accompanying note 153 supra, that since "title" is really a bundle of rights, the prohibition
of enough of those rights may be regarded as a taking.
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The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the
morals, or the safety of the public, is not, and consistently with
the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened
with the condition that the state must compensate such individual
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not
being permitted, by a noxious
use of their property, to inflict in167
jury upon the community.
And finally, he referred to the "diminution of value" theory:
There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins. Although a comparison of values before and after is
relevant, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. .

.

. it is by no

means conclusive .... 168
Having given attention to all three theories the Court concluded:
The ordinance in question was passed as a safety measure, and the
town is attempting to uphold it on that basis. To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need to know such things as the nature
of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and
effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss
which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance. 69

Since no evidence of harm to the defendant had been submitted, other
than that further mining would be impossible under the ordinance in
question 70 the Court found that the defendant's burden of showing the
ordinance to be unreasonable-and hence unconstitutional-had not
1
been met.

71

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to have adhered strictly to
the Guidelines and the holding of Goldblatt. The court analyzed Harmar and Pittsburgh,as to reasonableness, along the same lines set forth
in Goldblatt. The court stated that the dangers of acid mine drainage
have been noted by the United States Congress, the Pennsylvania legislature and the courts; 1 72 and found an "obvious" nexus between the
167. Id. at 593, quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
168. Id. at 594.
169. Id. at 595 (emphasis added); see Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894):
To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Quoted by the Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. at 594-95, and by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Nos. 89-90, at 15 (Pa., Mar.
16, 1973).
170. 369 U.S. at 596-97.
171. Id. at 595-96.
172. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 15 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
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clear legislative intent to prevent further acid mine drainage pollution,
and restricting the pumping of acid mine water into surface streams
where the pumping was to make active mining possible. 173 The court
tied in both the beneficial interest, or title theory, and the diminution in value theory, to determine whether there had been a taking of
property, finding that the imposition of a total treatment requirement
174
was not as onerous as the restrictions imposed in the Slaughter House
and Reinmann v. Little Rock Cases,' 75 nor did a total treatment requirement deny Pittsburgh and Harmar the use and enjoyment of their
176
property either as coal production fields or as "private" property.
The court emphasized at several points that "[T]he prohibition upon
the enterprise of mining is not absolute, but only makes its operation
more expensive,"1 77 and footnoted an admission by Pittsburgh Coal
that it would continue to operate even if required to treat the entire
discharge.178 Obviously, the distinction between absolutely prohibiting
mining and "only making its operation more expensive" is not a very
firm one. At some point, for example, mining could clearly become so
expensive that it would be more economical to close the mine than to
continue mining. 79
Did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court mean by making the distinction to imply that if there had been an absolute prohibition, or a
situation amounting to economic impossibility, it would have decided
the other way? Or by citing Goldblatt,8 0 where there was what
amounted to an absolute prohibition, did the court mean to imply that
even an absolute prohibition would not have rendered the Clean
Streams Law unconstitutional?
One can distinguish Goldblattl8 l on the grounds that the defendant
in that case did not prove that he was harmed by the ordinance in question-even though he could not use the mine for mining, he could still
173.

83 U.S. 36 (1873).

174. 237 U.S. 71 (1915).
175. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 16 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 16-17.
178. Id. at 17 n.9.
179. The court recognized this in its discussion, id at 14, of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For some mines this "commercial impracticability" could
conceivably become a problem under the new 1.5 ppm water quality standard for iron,
recently enacted for many streams in Pennsylvania by the Environmental Quality Board,
Regulations, Pa. Dept. of Env. Resources, §§ 93.5, 93.6(b)(8), 93.6(b)(10), 3 PA. BULL. 331
(1973); id. §§ 93.5, 93.6(b)(2)-(5), 93.6(b)(7)-(11), 93.7(c)(11)-(12), 3 PA. BULL. 764-95 (1973).
180. 369 U.S. 590 (1961).
181. Id.
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use it182 for other purposes, perhaps purposes as valuable as gravel mining, in so far as one might tell from the record. Where the property. is
an underground coal seam, however, it is difficult to see how it could be
argued, even speculatively, with no evidence in the record, that it could
have any other beneficial use. Thus, proof of harm to the affected prop,
erty owner should be fairly easy to establish.
On the other hand, the supreme court was copious in its references
to the injuriousness of acid mine drainage, and the harm to the Commonwealth from discharging acid mine water to surface streams.,i 3
And, in its comment on retroactivity,8 4 the court concentrated on the
present discharge, rather than on the past mining operations. This indicates that in a case where a particular regulation clearly presented
either an absolute prohibition against mining or commercial impracticability, the court might well apply a public nuisance approach. They
would be following the policy lead of the legislature in reasoning that
the discharge of acid mine water was so noxious that terminating that
evil justified in a particular case forcing a cessation of coal mining and
85
thereby the practical confiscation of property.
Both Pittsburgh Coal Co. and Harmar Coal Co. had relied on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon'8 6 as authority that the Clean Streams Law
was unconstitutional.' 8 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court :correctly
indicated that Mahon is distinguishable both factually and theoretically. In Mahon the coal company had sold the surface rights to certain
property but expressly retained the right to remove the coal beneath
and remove the subsurface support.18,8 The United States Supreme
Court held that a statute absolutely prohibiting the removal of subsurface support was invalid as to those lands to which the coal company
had sold only the surface rights, without the right to support.8 9 Factually, Mahon is distinguishable because neither Pittsburgh Coal Co.
nor Harmar Coal Co. is being denied the right to remove its coal; the
companies may continue to operate their mines, they simply may not
182. Id. at 595-96.
183. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 16-17 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
184. Id. at 19.
185. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), and cases cited therein. This is admittedly a rather close judgment on the language of this opinion; it is based partly upon
the fact that the court consistently chose broadening, rather than narrowing, interpretations of the Clean Streams Law, and partly upon the tenor of the opinion.
186. 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
187. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 18 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
188. 260 U.S. at 412; Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 18 (Pa.,
Mar. 16, 1973).
189. 260 U.S. at 414; Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 18 (Pa.,
Mar. 16, 1973).
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discharge acid mine drainage into the surface water of the Commonwealth without first treating it. Theoretically the cases are distinguishable because in Mahon the effect of the statute was to take the property
of the coal companies and give it to people who had acquired only surface rights. 190
The "Guidelines"
In 1966 the Pennsylvania Department of Health published a "Mine
Drainage Manual" that contained a section entitled "Guidelines Regarding Mining in Areas Affected by Inactive Workings." 19 ' The mining companies argued, and the commonwealth court agreed, 9 2 that
since these were officially approved by the Sanitary Water Board they
were regulations, and that to the extent they applied to these cases the
Board was bound by them.193 The question of the extent to which the
Guidelines actually did apply to these cases was extensively briefed by
9 4
both parties.
The supreme court held, however, that they were merely policy
statements, not binding upon the Board:
Had the Board intended otherwise, it would not have failed to file
these guidelines with the Department of State as is required by
Section 21 of the Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945,
190. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 18 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
191. Guidelines, supra note 118.
192. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 416-19, 286 A.2d at 464-65; 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 440, 285 A.2d
at 898.
193. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 440, 285 A.2d at 898.
194. The portions of these Guidelines, supra note 118, relevant to the Harmar and
Pittsburgh cases provided as follows:
3. Operations which intercept mine water pools which have a discharge point other
than that proposed by the operator, or drain to a common pool.
The operator(s) will be required to comply with Sanitary Water Board requirements for amount of pollutants created by his operation. The maximum limitation would be the Base Waste Load* or the standards set by the Board whichever
is higher.
That where more than one operation drains to a common pool, all the operations jointly and individually be held responsible for compliance with Sanitary
Water Board requirements.
4. Mining requiring the pumping or draining of adjacent inactive mines to protect
the active workings.
The operator(s) will be required to meet Board requirements for drainage from
his active mine as well as the pollutional increments in excess of the estimated
Base Waste Load* resulting from changes in the drainage pattern in the inactive
mine. The maximum limitation would be the Base Waste Load or the standards
set by the Board whichever is higher.
*
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P.L. 1388, as amended, 71 P.S. § 1710.21, in order for them to become effective as regulations. 95
While this may be technically correct, and while procedural requirements of the Administrative Agency Law'98 and the Commonwealth
Documents Law,

97

if they are to mean anything at all, must be applied,

this result nevertheless leaves one feeling a little uneasy. If an administrative agency tells somebody to do something, and that person does it,
it may be legal for the agency to change its mind where the "telling"
was informal, but a question is raised as to fairness. 98
Perhaps it was fair in these cases. Neither coal company had expended great sums of money in reliance upon the Guidelines. While it
is true their permit applications were predicated upon the theory that
the Guidelines were applicable, this reliance meant that they were not
spending money to treat the water from the adjacent mines; 199 their
reliance, at least up to the date of the supreme court decision, was saving them money. There was no indication that they had invested in
the construction of treatment facilities that were incompatible with the
new interpretation and would have to be scrapped, or that they had
invested in opening a mine that would have to be closed if the Guidelines were not binding on the Sanitary Water Board.200
This decision, therefore, does not overrule such earlier cases as Stahl
v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. 20 1 or Commonwealth v.

Folcroft Landfill Corp.20° 2 where it was held that in appropriate cases
even the Commonwealth can be estopped to assert some right. These
195. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 20 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
Having earlier concluded that the Clean Streams Law applied to the actions of Harmar
Coal Co. and Pittsburgh Coal Co., see text accompanying notes 128-39 supra, the court
went on to say of the applicability of the Guidelines:
More important, we are not bound by rulings or regulations which are contrary to
the governing statutes under which they are promulgated ....
The Clean Streams
Law properly requires treatment of the discharges in the present cases and, therefore,
the guidelines, to the extent that they are contrary to the Clean Streams Law, are
invalid.
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 21 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973) (citations
omitted).
196. Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945, Pa. P.L. 1388, as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.21-.51 (1968).
197. Commonwealth Document Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1101-611 (Supp. 1973).
198. See text accompanying notes 102-04 & 111-12 supra.
199. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 17 n.9 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
200. Id. On the contrary, both mines were opened prior to the publication of the
Guidelines, supra note 118; and at least one of the mining companies, Pittsburgh Coal Co.
indicated it could and would build a treatment facility and continue mining in the event
of an adverse decision. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civl Nos. 89-90, at 17 n.9 (Pa.,
Mar. 16. 1973).
201. 411 Pa. 121, 191 A.2d 386 (1963).
202. 1 Pa. Comm. Ct. 356 (1961).
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cases recognize the limitation that ordinarily the rights of the public
should not be subject to estoppel because of acts, representations or, in
case of laches, delays of agents of the government. But they also recognize that in some instances individual rights may have been so prejudiced by such acts, representations, or delays that estoppel should be
20
applied despite this principle.

3

The supreme court in these cases did not discuss the estoppel issue.
But as noted above,2 04 perhaps it was not considered relevant.
20 5

Aquatic Studies
Before setting water quality standards for Deer Creek, the Sanitary
Water Board had not performed an aquatic biology study to determine
in detail the. biological capacity of that stream, and the applicability
and meaningfulness of the effluent standards relative to the capacity of
Deer Creek to assimilate the discharge. 2 6 The commonwealth court
207
found that fact fatal to the validity of the Board's effluent standards.
The supreme court held that:
Harmar does not attack the reasonableness of the regulation, but
rather asks that. we substitute our judgment, by requiring an
aquatic study, for that of a body selected for its expertise whose
experience makes it better qualified than a court to establish technical standards. This we will not do. In the absence of a purely
arbitrary exercise of an agency's duties or functions "judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative discretion."
Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 573,
203. Commonwealth ex tel. Storb v. Schroll, 398 Pa. 354, 157 A.2d 179 (1960). In Stahl
v. First Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 411 Pa. 121, 129, 191 A.2d 386, 391 (1963), the court said:
The landmark case in Pennsylvania on the subject of whether laches may be imputed to the Commonwealth is Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v. Philadelphia B. &
B. M. Turnpike Company, 153 Pa. 47, 53, 55, 25 A. 1105, 1106, a quo warranto proceeding. Therein, Mr. Chief Justice Paxson after reviewing the authorities, concluded: "Were the complainant here a private individual we would not hesitate
to say that his laches was a bar to this proceeding. Is the commonwealth in any
better position? We think not. It is true, the statute of limitations does not run
against the commonwealth. But this is not a question of the statute of limitations.
It is a question of laches and laches may be imputed to the commonwealth as well
as to an individual" (Emphasis supplied.).
204. See note 195 and text accompanying notes 199-200 supra.
205. The issue of whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the Sanitary Water Board in Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos.
89-90, at 21 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973), will not be separately discussed here; since it was disposed
of by the court without discussion, there is not much that can be said about it. See notes
120-22 supra.
206. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 442, 285 A.2d at 902.
207. It is significant here that the violation alleged is the iron content of the discharge being above the permitted levels. Indeed, no aquatic study has been made by
the Board! It is not charged that the increase of the flow makes the aquatic life
less possible to survive.
Id.
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109 A.2d 331, 335 (1954) [sic]* Our review is particularly restrictive where an administrative agency resolves complex questions of
technology and finance. Pete Flaherty v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, -

Pa.

-,

-

A.2d -

(1973). The Board, having

adopted standards of general applicability, need not also
conduct
208
aquatic studies in every instance to establish pollution.
just how far this holding can
standards should undoubtedly
to stream water quality, if only
that there be some reasonable

be. carried remains to be seen. Effluent
have some relevant factual connection
to satisfy the constitutional requirement
nexus between the public good to be

accomplished and the restriction imposed in order to accomplish it.209

Perhaps the amended structure of water quality regulations, whereby
the Environmental Quality Board adopts stream water quality standards first, and then ties effluent standards to specific stream standards, 210 makes this issue largely moot as to future cases. Nevertheless,
the extent to which the Environmental Quality Board will be required
to have had some evidence to back up both its water quality standard
and its effluent standard decisions. under this holding will be interesting.
What Now?
The Harmar and Pittsburgh21n decision raises some interesting questions about the future. For one thing,'is the entire concept of "Base
Waste Load"212 now irrelevant? We would say no, even though the
Guidelines are themselves no longer, strictly, applicable. Two situations
suggest themselves.
(1) If, for example, the Hutchinson (or another) Mine were at the
top 'of the dip in a particular basin, and water discharge from the
bottom end of the basin was increased (and could be proved conclusively to have increased) from 2.17 million gallons per. day to 3.44 million gallons per day, then can it be said that the mining operation
"caused" the entire discharge? 213 No. Except for the mining operations,
208. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil .Nos. 89-90, at 23 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
209. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Nebbia v. 'New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
210. See generally Greene, Kyle & Watson, Water Pollution Control in Texas-Part II:
The Texas Water Quality Board, 48 TEX. L. REv. 1029, 1047-85 (1970); Hines, Nor Any
Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality; State Pollution Control Programs, 52
IOWA L. REv.' 186 (1966); Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-14
(Supp. 1972).
211. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
212. For definition of "Base Waste Load" see Guidelines, supra notes 118 & 194.
213. To use the Pittsburgh Coal figures see text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
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2.17 million gallons per day would still be discharging from the basin;
hence, the mining operation is the cause of only 1.27 million gallons
per day-the increase. The distinction from Harmar and Pittsburgh
seems to be that in the latter case the court was convinced that the
entire discharge was occasioned by the mining operations. 214 Under
that decision, the concept of Base Waste Load may still have some
application insofar as it relates to whether a particular mining operation caused an increase in acid mine water discharge.
(2) What about discharges to an underground mine pool? The
Guidelines advise (and we now know it is only advice) that such water
need not be treated to an effluent quality better than the underground
pool itself. 215 Again, even if the Guidelines are no longer valid as law,
the reasons for them would seem to be. As was argued by appellant in
the PittsburghCoal brief:
As a result of this pollutional phenomenon [whereby the rise
and fall of the water level in abandoned mines creates mine acid2 18 ]
when the drainage of an active mine discharges into an underground pool, regardless of how pure or clean the water is as it discharges from the mine into the pool, it will be polluted by the time
it is discharged as a part of the pool into a stream of the Commonwealth, if such discharge of the pool occurs. The pollution will
result both from the dissolving of iron and acid salts by the drainage and by its mixture with the already polluted pool. Thus, if
the drainage had to be treated prior to its discharge into the pool,
it would then have to be treated a second time, along with the
water from the pool. This would be, if not a complete waste of
effort and financial resources, at least a needless diminution
thereof. To reduce this loss, guideline 3 requires only that the discharge coming from the active mine not be more polluted than
the pool into which it is flowing. Practically invariably no treatment will be required because the discharge will be less polluted
than the pool, if for no other reason than the water in the pool has
had longer to absorb iron and acid salts. If, as in situation (2), the
pool does not discharge to a stream of the Commonwealth, again
no useful purpose would be served by treatment, even though a
of the Clean Streams Law would require treatstrict application
7
21

ment.

214. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 11 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
215. Guidelines, supra notes 118 & 194 (§ 3); see quote accompanying note 217 infra.
216. See note 8 supra.
217. Brief for Appellant on appeal from Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board
at 67-68, Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil No. 90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
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Again, the court's argument with respect to causation would seem to
cover this case, even in the absence of the Guidelines.
(3) A third fact situation, not explicitly dealt with in the Guidelines
but essentially a combination of the above two, may be suggested. If, in
a situation like the first, water is discharged into an existing mine water
pool, that water may well be of better quality than the water in the pool
itself, and yet cause a measurable increase in poorer quality water at
some discharge point miles away at the lower end of the basin. 218 Here,

it would seem that the same arguments with respect to causation would
permit the Commonwealth to require treatment of the excess water
(e.g., to use the Pittsburgh Coal figures, 219 the 1.27 million gallons per
day) but not the "Base Waste Load" (i.e., the 2.44 million gallons per
day) at the discharge point, to the same degree that would be required
if that excess water-the poorer quality 1.27 million gallons per daywere being discharged directly from the mine to a surface stream.
(4) What about the treatment of water from inactive mines, by the
former operators of those mines? One can imagine several situations.
(a) Suppose a mine that was opened prior to 1945 (when the Clean
Streams Law was amended to require a "complete drainage plan" prior
to opening or reopening a mine)220 and 1965 (when the Clean Streams
Law was made clearly applicable to all acid mine drainage), 221 or even
218. In the first example we assumed implicitly that the water would be treated as it
left the discharge point. The Guidelines, supra notes 118 & 194, seem to require treatment
as the water leaves the mine, and is discharged into the underground pool. See quote
accompanying note 217 supra.
219. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
220. Act of May 8, 1945, § 7, Pa. P.L. 440-43 (repealed 1965).
Section 313. Approval of Plans of Drainage.-Before any existing or new coal mine
may be opened or reopened, and before any existing coal mine may be continued in
operation, a plan of the proposed drainage and disposal of industrial wastes, and acid
mine drainage of such mine, shall be submitted to the Sanitary Water Board, and it
shall be unlawful to open or reopen any such mine, or to continue the operation of
any mine, or to change or alter any already approved plan of drainage and disposal
of industrial wastes, and acid mine drainage from such mine, unless and until the
board, after consultation with the Department of Mines has approved such plan or
change of plan: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to the continuation of the operation of an existing mine until sixty (60) days after the effective date
of this act....
221. Section 1 of the Clean Streams Law as amended in 1965 defined industrial waste
as follows:
"Industrial waste" shall be construed to mean any liquid, gaseous or solid substance, not sewage, resulting from any manufacturing or industry, or from any establishment, as herein defined, and mine drainage, silt, coal mine solids, rock, debris,
dirt and clay from coal mines, coal collieries, breakers or other coal processing
operations.
Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 1, Pa. P.L. 374, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp.
1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987; see text accompanying notes 67-68
supra.
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prior to 1945? (b) Suppose a mine that was opened prior to 1945 but became inactive after 1966 (when a permit was required to continue
operating)? 22 (c) Suppose a mine that was opened before or after 1945
and ceased operations after 1965, but before a permit was required to
Continue operation? 22 3 (d) Suppose a mine that opened:before or after
1945 and ceased operations after 1965, but after a permit was required
to continue operation?224 (e) Suppose a mine that opened before or
after 1945 and ceased operating after 1970 (when, in order to get a
permit to continue operating, a complete drainage plan, -including
225
post-mining discharge was required)?
*222. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. -tit. 35,
§ 691.315 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315, Pa. P.L. 1987.
Section 5. The act is amended by adding, after section 314, three new sections-to
read:
Section 315. Permits for Operation of Coal Mines.-(a) Before any coal mine is
opened, reopened, or continued in operation, an application for a permit approving
the proposed drainage and disposal of industrial wastes shall be submitted to the
Sanitary Water Board. The application shall contain complete drainage plans including
any restoration measures that will be taken 'after operations have ceased and such
other information as the board by regulation shall require.
... (b) It shall be unlawful to open, reopen, or continue-in operation any coal mine,
or to change or alter any approved plan of drainage and disposal of industrial wastes,
unless and until the board, after consultation -with the Department of Mines and
Mineral Industries, has issued a permit approving the plan or change pf plan. A
permit shall not be issued if the board shall be of the opinion that, the discharge
from the mine would be or become inimical or injurious to the public health, animal
or aquatic life, or to the use of the water for domestic or industrial consumption or
recreation. In issuing a permit the board may impose such conditions as are necessary
,to protect the waters of the Commonwealth. The permittee shall comply with such
permit conditions and with the rules and regulations of the board.
The effective date of the 1965 amendments was January 1, 1966.223. Id.
224. Id.
225. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315,
Pa. P.L. 1987 provides:
Section .315. Operation of Mines.--(a) No person or municipality shall operate a
mine or allow a discharge from a mine into the waters of the Commonwealth unless
such operation or discharge is authorized by the rules and regulations of the board
or such, person or municipality has first obtained a permit from the department:
Operation of the mine shall include preparatory work in connection with the opening or reopening of a mine, backfilling, sealing, and other closing procedures, and any
other work done on land'or water in connection With the mine. A discharge from a
mine shall include a discharge which occurs after mining operations have ceased,
provided that the mining operations were conducted subsequent to January 1, 1966,
under circumstances requiring a permit from the Sanitary Water Board under the
provisions of section 315(b) of this act as it existed under the amendatory act ofAugust 23, 1965 (P.L. 372)....
(b) The department may require an applicant for a permit to operate a. mine, or a
permittee holding a permit to operate a mine under the provisions of this section, to
post a bond or bonds in favor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and with good
and sufficient sureties acceptable to the department to insure that there will'be compliance with the law, the rules and regulations of the board, and the provisions and
conditions of such permit including conditions pertaining to restoration measures' or
other provisions insuring that there will be no polluting discharge after mining
operations have ceased....
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This last case will, of course, be the case of the Hutchinson Mine and
the Harmar Mine, when they :cease operations at some point in the
future. There does not seem to be much doubt that under the 1970
amendments to the Clean Streams Law they can be required to treat
the acid mine drainage from their respective mines after closure, unless
they are able to seal the mines or otherwise prevent acid mine water
226
from being discharged.

The supreme court does not say a great deal about any of these
possible cases-it presumably will have a chance to say something about
some of them in the future. The court does define "mine" to include
inactive mines 22 7 and it does not regard the fact that the Commonwealth was to undertake the treatment of acid mine drainage from
inactive mines, under the Act of December 15, 1965,228 as being at all
determinative:
Mine drainage does not cease to be mine drainage once mining
has ceased in the mine from which it continues to drain. The
Court's reliance on the Act of December 15, 1965, P.L. 1075, 35
P.S. § 760.1 (1972-73 Supplement), was misplaced. Although this
Act directs the Secretary of the Department of Mines and Mineral
Industries to "initiate an immediate action program to correct
pollution from abandoned deep and strip mines . . ." it does not

permit a mine operator to discharge untreated acid mine drainage
into the surface waters of the Commonwealth, contrary to the
Clean Streams Law. It is directed at mines long closed at a time
when operators of those mines might not even be known.2 29
How long must a mine be closed for that law to apply? Long enough
that the operator is no longer known? Or is the date of closure to be
keyed into the legislative history of the Clean Streams Law in some
way? These questions were presumably left to future decisions.
BARNES

&

TUCKER

The second (or perhaps third, depending on how one interprets the
facts) hypothetical above is Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,280
decided by the commonwealth court one month after the Supreme
226.

Id.

227.

Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 11 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).

228.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 760.1-.2 (Supp. 1973).

229. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 13 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973)
(emphasis added).
230. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973). The Commonwealth intends to appeal this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and on May 16,
1973 filed exceptions with the commonwealth court.
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Court of Pennsylvania handed down its decision in Harmar and Pittsburgh.23 1 The Barnes & Tucker case involved a "breakout"-a discharge through an opening into the mine or through the earth's surface
after the mine was sealed.23 2 The court dealt with numerous and complex factual and legal issues, finally holding that Barnes & Tucker is not
responsible under the Clean Streams Law then in effect or under any
other legal doctrine, for abatement or treatment of acid mine drainage
from its abandoned Lancashire No. 15 Mine (hereinafter No. 15
mine). 233 Although, as the court noted, Barnes & Tucker may be of
little precedential value because it was decided on its unique facts and
the Clean Streams Law then in effect,2 3 4 the decision raises some significant issues and therefore merits detailed consideration.
The No. 15 mine is a deep bituminous coal mine located in the "B"
(Lower Kittanning) seam of coal in the Barnesboro Basin area of Cambria and Indiana counties. The Barnesboro Basin is bounded on the
east by the Laurel Hill Anticline, on the west by the Nolo Anticline,
on the south by unmined coal and on the north by the West Branch of
the Susquehanna River (hereinafter West Branch). The Laurel Hill
and Nolo anticlines represent the highest points of elevation in the
Barnesboro Basin. Most of the No. 15 mine is situated in the Barnesboro Syncline, which lies between the Laurel Hill and Nolo anticlines
and which represents the lowest section in elevation of the Barnesboro
Basin.

23 5

The No. 15 mine was opened in 1915 in the northeast section of the
mine near where the coal outcrops in the vicinity of the West Branch.
From 1915 until the mine was closed in 1969, mining operations were
conducted in the No. 15 mine along the dip of the coal seam-that is,
from the highest elevation of the coal seam at the outcrop near the
West Branch in a southwesterly direction to the lowest area of elevation
of the coal seam. 23 6 Barnes & Tucker ceased its mining operations in
231. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973). The
commonwealth court noted in a footnote, that the Harmar and Pittsburgh decision was
filed after the Barnes & Tucker opinion was prepared, and stated:
We have carefully reviewed the opinion of the Supreme Court in those cases and,
while certain observations and discussion contained therein might ideally suggest
some revision of discussion contained in the above opinion, we are of the opinion
that the decision in those cases is not controlling of this case. To avoid further delay
we, therefore, hand down our opinion in this case without revision.
No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 63 n.* (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
232. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
233. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 61-62 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
234. Id. at 36.
235. Id. at 2.
236. Id. at 3.
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the No. 15 mine on May 10, 1969 and then proceeded to seal the mine
openings and complete construction of barriers between the No. 15
mine and the adjacent No. 24-B mine. The construction of barriers and
seals was performed in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries then in effect and completed in
late July of 1969.237
The mine drainage permit history of the No. 15 mine, around which
much of the controversy centers, is enlightening. From 1945 to 1964,
the No.' 15 mine was operated under two mine drainage permits. 238
Little need be said about these two permits except that they did not
require treatment of the mine drainage and did not include any provision for post-mining discharge. On December 21, 1964, the Sanitary
Water Board issued a new permit, No. 564M (hereinafter pre-1965
permit), approving Barnes 8c Tucker's proposed plan of drainage from
the mine. As with the two earlier permits, the pre-1965 permit did not
require that mine drainage be treated nor did it include any provision
23 91
for post-mining discharge.

On May 25, 1966, Barnes & Tucker, in accordance with section 315
(d) of the 1965 amendments to the Clean Streams Law, 240 applied to
the Sanitary Water Board for an extension of time to operate the No.
15 mine under the pre-1965 permit. The Board granted Barnes 8c
Tucker an extension until November 1, 1968.241
In October of 1967, Barnes & Tucker applied for a mine drainage
permit for its Nos. 15 and 24 mines on an application form used for
post-1965 amendment permits. Barnes 8c Tucker disclosed in this application for the first time that it contemplated closing the No. 15
mine. Permit No. 567M (hereinafter post-1965 amendment permit)
was issued by the Board, subject to certain standard conditions accepted
by Barnes & Tucker, on May 22, 1968.242 On two separate occasions
237. Id. at 16-17.
238. Id. at 7-8.
239. Id. at 9. No requirement for treatment of mine drainage was imposed or any
provision included for post-mining discharge even though a substantial drainage of high
acid and iron content was anticipated from the mine. The court noted that, under the
1945 amendments to the Clean Streams Law which were in effect at the time of issuance of
permit No. 564M, Barnes & Tucker would have been required to treat the discharge from
the No. 15 mine if the streams into which the discharge was to flow had not been already
polluted. Id. at 9-10.
240. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.315(d) (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315, Pa. P.L. 1987.
241. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 10 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
242. Id. at 12-14. The standard conditions incorporated into the post-1965 amendment
permit which are relevant to this case are as follows:
(6) The permittee shall notify the reporting agency [Department of Health] by
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after the issuance of the post-1965 amendment permit, Barnes & Tucker
applied for and was granted two further extensions of time to operate
the No. 15 mine under the pre-1965 permit. The third and last extenSion was until May 20, 1969, and once again subject to certain conditions but which Barnes & Tucker never accepted. 243 It should be
pointed out that there was a serious dispute concerning the two extensions of time under the pre-1965 permit after Barnes,& Tucker applied
for and the Sanitary Water Board issued the post-1965 amendment
permit. This controversy is relevant to the interpretation of the Clean
Streams Law then in effect and is discussed hereinafter.
All equipment including that for construction of barriers and seals
was removed from the No. 15 mine by the end of July 1969 and the
244
mine was allowed to flood.

In late June 1970, a substantial discharge of acid mine drainage was
discovered emanating from the "Buckwheat" borehole of the inactive
No. 15 mine and flowing into the West Branch. On July 23, 1970, another discharge into the West Branch was discovered flowing through
245
the earth's surface in what is referred to as the "breakout" area.
certified mail that he had completed operations within fifteen (15) days after mining
is completed.
(7) Whenever, because of an accident or otherwise, a discharge not allowed by the
permit occurs, the permittee shall immediately telephone the reporting agency to
report such incident and shall promptly take such steps as are necessary to halt the
unauthorized discharge.
(8) The permittee shall fully comply with the mine closure procedures set forth in
the plan for drainage in an expeditious manner after mining has been completed.
(10) The permittee shall at no time discharge to the waters of the Commonwealth
mine drainage from any source the pH of which is less than 6.0, or greater than 9.0.
(11) The permittee shall at no time discharge to the waters of the Commonwealth
mine drainage from any source containing a concentration of iron in excess of 7
milligrams per liter.
(12) The permittee at no time shall discharge to the waters of the Commonwealth
mine drainage from any source the acid content of which . . . exceeds its alkaline
content ....
Id. at 13.
243. Id. at 15. The standard conditions incorporated by the Sanitary Water Board into
the third time extension of the pre-1965 permit were identical with those imposed in the
first two time extensions. The court considered the following standard conditions of
possible relevancy:
Three: No silt, coal mine solids, rock, debris, dirt and clay shall be washed, conveyed
or otherwise deposited into the waters of the Commonwealth.
Six: The permittee shall notify the reporting agency by certified mail that he has
completed operations within fifteen (15) days after mining is completed.
Seven: Whenever, because of an accident or otherwise, a discharge not allowed by the
permit occurs, the permittee shall immediately telephone the reporting agency to report
such incident and shall promptly take such steps as are necessary to halt the unauthorized discharge.
Id. at 11 (quoted by the court).
244. Id. at 16.
245. Id. at 19-20.
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Those two discharges resulted in a series of administrative rulings by
the Sanitary Water Board in July 1970. In essence, the Sanitary Water
Board suspended Barnes & Tucker's outstanding post-i965 amendment
mine drainage permit and ordered Barnes & Tucker to take action immediately to abate the acid mine water discharges from -the No. '15
mine. Barnes & Tucker appealed the administrative orders of the Sanitary Water Board to the commonwealth court and the Commonwealth
filed a complaint in equity seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The Commonwealth's complaint sought to enjoin Barnes &
Tucker from operating the No. 15 mine and to require Barnes &
Tucker to immediately take steps to treat the acid mine drainage dis2 46
charge to specified water quality standards.
The Commonwealth and Barnes, & Tucker then entered into a
stipulation, accepted by the court, whereby the Commonwealth would
continue treating the acid mine drainage discharge from the No. 15
mine and Barnes &Tucker would construct and operate for 'a period of
at least thirty days a pumping and treatment facility at Duman Dam, a
pumpingfacility near the lower end of the Barnesboro Basin. 247 Barnes
& Tucker constructed and operated the Duman Dam facility for 114
days and then terminated -its responsibility in accordance with the
stipulation. The Commonwealth voluntarily assumed the operation of
the Duman Dam pumping and treatment facility and renewed its
48
- :
application for a preliminary injunction.2
The court, in an admittedly novel and unprecedented decision,
granted the Commonwealth's request and ordered. Barnes & Tucker to
resume operation of the Duman Dam facility.249 Irreparable harm was
not presently existing because the Commonwealth was voluntarily
operating the facility; however, the court held that irreparable harm
was "so close toreality, with calamitous'results if it becomes a reality,
that a-court in its :equitable powers should consider threatened or
potential irreparable harm as the equivalent of existing. irreparable
harm. ' 210 The court'.,considered the public interest in the continued
operation of the pumping and treatment facility because the cessation
of this operation would-result in harm which could not readily be cor246.
247.
to and
.248.
249.
250.

Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 1 Pa. Comm. Ct. 552, 554-55 (1971).
Id. at 556. The court made the stipulation a part of the record but was not asked
did not issue a preliminary injunction incorporating the stipulation.
No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 22-24 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr.. 16, 1973).
1 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 558-60.
Id. at 558.
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rected or compensated in dollar damages. 251 The court's order directed
that the costs of operating the Duman Dam facility be shared equally
by Barnes & Tucker and the Commonwealth, with the ultimate costs to
be borne by the losing party after a final decision in the case.
The commonwealth court's final decision, by President Judge James
S. Bowman, held that (1) Barnes 9c Tucker, as a holder of a time extended pre-1965 permit and a post-1965 amendment permit, did not
assume responsibility under the Clean Streams Law or any regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto then in effect for acid mine water drainage from the No. 15 mine after mining operations ceased; (2) Barnes 8c
Tucker did not become responsible under section 316 of the Clean
Streams Law then in effect for abatement of the post-mining acid mine
water discharge from the No. 15 mine; (3) the post-mining acid mine
drainage from the No. 15 mine does not constitute a public nuisance
under section 3 of the Clean Streams Law then in effect for which
Barnes 8c Tucker is responsible for abating; and (4) the post-mining
acid mine drainage emanating from the No. 15 mine does not constitute a common law nuisance for which Barnes 8c Tucker is responsible.2 52 Procedurally, the court left its earlier order in effect pending
(1) the filing of an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court within
30 days or (2) failing such appeal, the holding of a hearing to determine
the amount of "the ultimate costs" that would have to be borne by the
253
Commonwealth under the earlier order.
Responsibility under the Clean Streams Law
The commonwealth court dealt with three separate questions in
determining that Barnes & Tucker did not assume responsibility under
the Clean Streams Law as amended in 1965 for the acid mine drainage
discharge from its abandoned No. 15 mine. These questions are:
(1) Did the 1965 amendments statutorily impose upon Barnes Se
Tucker responsibility for the post-mining discharge from the
inactive No. 15 mine?
251. Id.at 559.
252. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 61-62 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973). In a
concurring opinion, Judge Glenn E. Mencer concurred in the result on the grounds that
the discharge was not caused by present activitiy on the part of the defendant; he thought
that the 1970 amendments to section 316 might be applied to the defendant (see text
accompanying notes 277-81 infra), but agreed that the Commonwealth had not taken the
necessary steps to do so.
253. Id. at 63.
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(2) If not, did the Clean -Streams Law empower the Sanitary Water
Board, as an element of an approved mine drainage plan, to
require a mine operator to assume responsibility for any postmining discharge? and
(3) If yes, did Barnes & Tucker assume such responsibility under
25 4
its extended pre-1965 permit or post-1965 amendment permit?

With respect to the first question, the commonwealth court ruled
that the Clean Streams Law as amended in 1965 did not impose responsibility upon mine operators for post-mining discharge. 2 5 The
court reviewed the statutory framework and placed great emphasis
upon the legislative intent before and subsequent to the 1965 amendments. According to the court, there is no doubt that prior to the 1945
amendments to the Clean Streams Law acid mine drainage was specifically excluded from regulation. The 1945 amendments prohibited
the discharge of acid mine drainage only into "clean waters" of the
Commonwealth and under section 313,25 6 required all existing, reopened, and newly opened mines to obtain approval of mine drainage
plans from the Sanitary Water Board. Barnes & Tucker operated the
No. 15 mine from 1945 to January 1, 1966-the effective date of the
1965 amendments-under approved mine drainage permits without
any requirement for treatment of discharge during or after mining
operations ceased. The commonwealth court, relying in part on the
case of Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Coal Co. 25 7 construed the 1945
254. Id. at 38.
255. Id. at 61-62.
256. Act of May 8, 1945, § 7, Pa. P.L. 440 (repealed 1965).
257. 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 378 (C.P. Dauph. Co. 1969). The court in this case held that
the Sanitary Water Board had no power under the 1945 amendments to the Clean
Streams Law to refuse to issue a permit because of alleged violations of other mine
drainage permits previously issued by the Board which covered other mines owned by
the applicant and which were later abandoned. The court stated:
Of further significance is the fact that the Clean Streams Act specifically referred
to mines being opened, reopened or continued in operation. Nowhere in the Clean
Streams Act is it suggested or implied that a former operator of an abandoned mine
can be held in "violation" after the mine is closed. Even in the case of Sanitary Water
Board v. Sunbeam Coal Corporation, 77 Dauph. 264 (1961), wherein we held that
future plans for the drainage of acid mine water after a mine closed could be required of an applicant at the time of originally applying for a permit, does not
constitute authority for the proposition that an applicant can be held in "violation"
of a permit after the mine is closed, when he followed the plans approved by the
board.
Once the Sanitary Water Board has approved a drainage plan and the drainage
plan has been followed, the responsibility of the operator ought not to be increased
after the mine has ceased any longer to be a mine.
Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added). The Sunbeam case is (or was, until Barnes & Tucker) the
leading decision in Pennsylvania on the non-applicability of the Clean Streams Law to
abandoned coal mines. The Sunbeam holding was changed by the 1970 amendments, and
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amendments as applying only to operatingmines, and not to abandoned
258
or inactive mines.
The court took a hard look at the 1965 amendments to the Clean
Streams Law, particularly section 315, to determine whether they applied only to operating mines or also to inactive and abandoned mines.
It noted the major change in legislative policy toward the acid mine
drainage and stream pollution problems and that the 1965 amendments
for the first time prohibited the discharge of acid mine drainage into
polluted'as well as clean waters.25 1 As discussed above under Legislation,260 acid mine drainage was brought within the definition of industrial waste and thereby became subject to-section 307 of the Act which
prohibited the operation of "any establishment, which in its operation
261
results in the discharge of 'industrial wastes" that causes pollution.
The serious dispute in the case involved the interpretation of section
315 as it existed in 1965. This new section required each operator to
obtain
a mine drainage permit before any coal mine was
opened, reopened, or continued in operation, and it was also empowered
the
Board, in issuing a permit, to impose whatever conditions were necessary to protect the waters of the Commonwealth. 262 However, section
315(d) afforded a mine operator the choice of applying for a new
permit under the' 1965 amendments or continuing in operation under
a valid permit issued prior to January 1, 1966 until January 1, 1967
or for such additional time periods as the Board allowed. 26 3 The

Commonwealth's pirincipal argument was that the 1965 amendments
imposed perpetual responsibility upon a mine operator for postmining discharges and that Barnes & Tucker assumed such responsibility by applying for and receiving the post-1965 amendment permit.
As support for this perpetual responsibility theory, the Commonwealth
cited the last sentence of section 315(a) which required that a mine
drainage permit, application "contain complete drainage plans includconceivably may be overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when it decides
Barnes & Tucker.
258. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 33-34 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
259. Id. at 36-37.
260.

See text accompanying notes 65-71 supra.

261.

Act of June .22, 1937, § 307, Pa. P.L. 1996, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,

§ 691.307 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).

262. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, PA. P.L. 376, as amended,

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 35,

§§ 691.315(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315, Pa. P.L. 1987.
263. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L.' 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.315(d) (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315, Pa. P.L 1987.
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ing any restoration measures that will be taken after operations have
ceased .....8264
On the other hand, Barnes & Tucker contended that it never
operated the No. 15 mine under the post-1965 amendment permit but
that it ceased operation of the No. 15 mine under the pre-1965 permit
and that permit's subsequent time extensions by the Board. Furthermore, even assuming that it did operate under the post-1965 amendment permit, Barnes & Tucker urged that the 1965 amendments did
not apply to post-mining discharges. 26 5
The commonwealth court agreed with Barnes & Tucker that the
1965 amendments did not impose perpetual responsibility upon mine
operators for post-mining discharge. Contrary to the contentions of
both parties, however, the court believed that whether or not Barnes
& Tucker operated under the pre-1965 permit or post-1965 amendment
permit was not controlling. It observed that the 1965 amendments to
the Clean Streams Law are silent on the subject of a mine operator's
responsibility for acid mine drainage discharge from their inactive
or abandoned mines or mines thereafter closed, and, therefore, determined the legislative intent as evidenced by other relevant matters, 266
including: (1) the title of the Act of August 23, 1965 which enacted the
1965 amendments was "an Act... requiring permits for the operation
of coal mines"; 26 7 (2) as discussed heretofore, the 1945 amendments
were held in the Sunbeam Coal case to apply only to operating
mines;2 68 (3) the 1965 amendments continued the scheme of the 1945
amendments in that language in subsection (a) and (b) of section
315 of the 1965 version of the Act is identical in substance to that contained in section 313 of the 1945 version; 269 (4) shortly after the Clean
Streams Law was amended in 1965 the General Assembly recognized
the problem of mine drainage from abandoned mines and passed the
Act of December 15, 1965270 to provide "for a massive attack by the State
264. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 39 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973), citing Act
of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 35, § 691.315 (Supp.
1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315, Pa. P.L. 1987 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 37-38.
266. Id.
267. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 11, Pa. P.L. 373, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.1 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 1, Pa. P.L. 1987.
268. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 40 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973), citing
Commonwealth v. Derstine, 418 Pa. 186, 210 A.2d 266 (1965); City Stores Co. v. Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 482, 103 A.2d 664 (1954).
269. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 39 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
270. Id.; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 760.1-.2 (Supp. 1973).
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itself with respect to mine drainage from abandoned mines"; 2 71 and
(5) the 1970 amendments clearly enunciated in section 315 that a mine
operator, with one limitation, is now responsible for "a discharge
272
which occurs after mining operations have ceased."
In regard to the second question the commonwealth court found
that the Sanitary Water Board did have the power under section 315(a)
and its general rule making power under section 403 of the Clean
Streams Law as it then existed to require a mine operator to assume
responsibility for post-mining discharge as part of an approved plan
of drainage. 273 As noted above, the last sentence of section 315(a)
required that an operator's application for a mine drainage permit
"contain complete drainage plans including any restoration measures
that will be taken after operations have ceased and such other information as the board by regulation shall require. '274
Finally, as to the third question, the commonwealth court found
that Barnes & Tucker did not assume under the standard conditions
and provisions imposed by the Board in granting the pre-1965 permit
or post-1965 amendment permit responsibility for mine drainage from
the No. 15 mine after mining operations ceased. None of the standard
conditions incorporated into the two permits imposed by any regulation responsibility upon Barnes 8c Tucker for post-mining discharge
from the No. 15 mine. The Sanitary Water Board's regulations and
corresponding "Guidelines" are primarily directed to operating mines
and drainage and closing procedures to prevent post-mining dis275
charge.
The court could not find any provision in the standard conditions,
Board's regulations or guidelines which specifically or inferentially
required Barnes 9c Tucker to correct post-mining discharge if it did
occur.
The court concluded:
Rules and regulations of administrative agencies, lawfully
adopted, are subject to the same rules of statutory construction
as statutes themselves but obviously cannot be construed to afford
a greater power or right in an administrative agency than that
271. No.
272. Id.;
1937, § 315,
273. No.
274. Act
§ 691.315(a)
275. No.
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896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 39 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315(a) (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22,
Pa. P.L. 1987.
896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 40 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
(Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 315, Pa. P.L. 1987.
896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 41-42 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
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imposed by the statute itself. The Commonwealth argues that the
legislative intent as manifested in the declaration of policy and
legislative findings contained in the 1965 amendments compels a
conclusion that the statute itself imposes post-mining discharge
responsibility upon a former operator as do the Board's regulations consistent with such expressed legislative intent. Considering
the legislative history of clean streams legislation both prior and
subsequent to the 1965 amendments to The Clean Streams Law,
there can be no doubt that the legislature was fully aware of and
conversant with the complex problems surrounding mine drainage
from closed mines whether they be characterized as having been
abandoned or otherwise. It is inconceivable that if in 1965 it
intended to place responsibility as argued by the Commonwealth,
it would leave the question open to inference. 278
This interpretation of the Clean Streams Law as it existed in 1965
seems reasonable. Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will share
the commonwealth court's viewpoint is an open question at this time.
Applicability of Section 316
The commonwealth court rejected, on the facts of the case, the Commonwealth's argument that Barnes & Tucker is responsible under section 316277 of the Clean Streams Law for the post-mining discharge
from the No. 15 mine as a "landowner" holding title to or having
proprietary interest in the lands comprising the mine. As originally
added to the Clean Streams Law in 1965, section 316278 provided a
means of access by mine operators, governmental agencies, or other
appropriate persons on to lands of others who refused to allow such
persons access to take whatever measures were necessary to eliminate
conditions on the lands which caused pollution. Section 316 was
amended in 1970279 to give the Sanitary Water Board the additional
authority to order the landowner or occupier to correct conditions on
the lands which cause or pose a danger of pollution. This section now
provides in part:
Whenever the Sanitary Water Board finds that pollution or a
danger of pollution is resulting from a condition which exists
276. Id. at 43.
277. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937,
§ 316, Pa. P.L. 1987.
278. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.316 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 316, Pa. P.L. 1987.
279. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937,
§ 316, Pa. P.L. 1987.
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on land in the Commonwealth the board may order the landowner or occupierto correct the condition in a manner satisfactory
to the board or it may order such owner or occupier to allow a
mine operator or other. person or agency of the Commonwealth.
access to the land or take such action. For the purpose of this section, "landowner" includes any person. holding title to or -having
a proprietary interest in either surface .or subsurface fights.
For the purpose of collecting or recovering the expense involved
in correcting the condition, the board may assess the amount due
in the same manner as civil penalties are assessed under the provisions of section 605 of -this act: Provided, however, That if the
board finds that the condition causing pollution or a danger of
pollution resulted from mining operations conducted prior to
January 1, 1966, under circumstances which did not require a
permit from the Sanitary Water Board under the provisions' of
section 315(b) of this act as it existed under the amendatory act of
August 23, 1965 (P.L. 372), then the amount assessed shall be
limited to the increase in value
of the property as a result of the
20
correction of the condition.
The commonwealth court refused to hold Barnes & Tucker liable
under section 316 because there was no evidence that the Sanitary
Water Board or Department ever, issued any order against Barnes &
Tucker.as a landowner or that it ever intended to exercise the power
it appafently has. under this section. All the facts and administrative
actions taken by the Commonwealth, material to its contention occurred
before July 31, 1970, the effective date of the 1970 amendments. 28
One question left unanswered by the commonwealth court in Barnes
Tucker is the validity and construction of section 316. By limiting
the decision to the facts of the case, it was not necessary for the court
to determine whether section 316 imposes absolute liability upon a
landowner or occupier for pollution caused by mine drainage from his
lands and whether the imposition of such liability without regard to
causation or fault is constitutional. Just what power, if any, the Commonwealth has under section 316 will have to be decided in the future.
Public Nuisance
The court in Barnes & Tucker 28 2 discussed both statutory and common law public nuisance. The practical consequence might be the
280.
281.
282.
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same, in that if the discharge in question were a public nuisance of
any sort then Barnes 8c Tucker could be required to abate or treat it.823
The Commonwealth's argument that the discharge had been declared by statute to be a public nuisance was based on section 3 of the
Clean Streams Law, which provided, from 1937 until 1970, that:
The discharge of sewage or industrial waste or any noxious and
deleterious substances into the waters of this Commonwealth,
which is or may become inimical and injurious to the public
health, or to animal or aquatic life, or to the uses of such waters
for domestic or industrial consumption, or for recreation, is hereby
declared not to be a reasonable or natural use of such
waters, to be
24
against public policy and to be a public nuisance.
The Commonwealth cited Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New
York & Pennsylvania Co., Inc.,285 for the propositions that (1) the
legislature could declare something to be a public nuisance, and
(2) once determined that something is a public nuisance equity has
jurisdiction to require abatement.2 8 6 While the issue in Shumaker
was quite narrow-whether the court there had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action 2 8 7-- the cite was still apposite. In order to
determine that jurisdiction existed, the Shumaker court had to (or at
least did) determine whether, assuming all facts averred in the com288
plaint were true, a public nuisance arguably existed.
The court in Barnes& Tucker, however, while accepting the proposition that the legislature could declare post-mining acid mine drainage
to be a public nuisance, held it had not done so at least until 1970.289
To decide otherwise, said the court,
...would be to close one's eyes to the provisions of The Clean
283. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 40, 79
A.2d 439 (1951); Commonwealth v. Dietz, 285 Pa. 511, 132 A. 572 (1926); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924).
284. Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987. In 1970 this section was amended to include
potential pollution as a public nuisance:
Discharge of Sewage and Industrial Wastes Not a Natural Use.-The discharge of
sewage or industrial waste or any substance into the waters of this Commonwealth,
which causes or contributes to pollution as herein defined or creates a danger of such
pollution is hereby declared not to be a reasonable or natural use of such waters, to
be against public policy and to be a public nuisance.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.3 (Supp. 1973).
285. 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951). This case was later decided in favor of the defendant on grounds not relevant to the issues here. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v.
New York & Pa. Co., Inc., 65 Dauph. 118 (Pa. C.P. 1953), afl'd, 378 Pa. 359 (1954).
286. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 46-48 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
287. 367 Pa. at 45-46, 79 A.2d at 443.
288. Id. at 47-55, 79 A.2d at 444-47.
289. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 48-49 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
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Streams Law as originally enacted and as amended in 1945, 1965
and 1970 and would render practically meaningless the original
exclusion of mine drainage from its original provisions and the
gradual elimination of the exclusion cluminating in the amendments of 1970.290
Once again, as in the interpretation of the word "mining" in Pittsburgh Coal,2 91 the commonwealth court appeared to view the movement of the legislature in 1965 into the field of acid mine drainage as
being somewhat tentative. 292 While this may be a plausible interpretation of the Clean Streams Law, on its face, one must nevertheless
wonder whether the supreme court, on appeal, will view the statute in
the same way. 2' 9 Certainly section 3 does not purport on its face to
be limited to pollutional acts explicitly defined in the Clean Streams
Law-in its terms section 3 is quite broad. A question may be raised
whether that section was intended to broaden the scope of common
law nuisance beyond the holding in Sagamore.294 Sagamore held that a
discharge into a clean stream that was being put to public use constituted a public nuisance. On its face section 3 of the Clean Streams Law
would make a discharge into any stream--clean or dirty-a public
nuisance if it detrimentally affected a public use. The supreme court
will undoubtedly have to consider the question whether the broad
language of section 3 was intended by the legislature to be read literally, or was intended to be limited by the exclusions set forth in the
remainder of the Act, especially the exclusion of acid mine drainage,
in force for already polluted streams until 1965.295

On the non-statutory public nuisance issue, the court traced the
application of common law nuisance principles to acid mine drainage
from Sanderson,296 through McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal
290. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
291. See note 129 supra.
292. See also Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970,
at 38-43, 48-49, 60-61 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
293. As already noted in note 129 supra and accompanying text, the supreme court
viewed the Clean Streams Law broadly, and emphasized its purpose. See also text accompanying notes 329-44 infra.
294. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924); see text
accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
295. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
296. On two grounds, reading the exclusions from the remainder of the act into section 3 seems plausible, but not overwhelmingly convincing. (1) In interpreting statutes
generally, the specific controls the general. Statutory Construction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
46, § 563 (1969). On the other
example, it would be likely to
R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281
does not encompass section 3.
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hand, the exclusion
be held to compel
Pa. 233, 126 A. 386
(2) In Collegeville

is not so all encompassing that, for
the overruling of, say, Pennsylvania
(1924). So perhaps the exclusion also
Borough v. Philadelphia Suburban
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Co.,2 07 and Roaring Creek Water Co. v. Anthracite Coal Co.298 The

court found that the factors that distinguished those cases from Sanderson were (a) the fact that the pollution was of an initially clean stream
that would not have been affected without a positive act-pumpingon the part of the defendant and (b) the fact that relatively small expenditures would be required to abate the pollution in each case. 299
Sagamore30 0 was found distinguishable because of the relative purity of
the stream involved and because it was used for domestic water supply
by a large number of people.3 01 Shumaker,3 02 although it contained
language that would seem to support the proposition that any discharge
of water that affects or may affect the public health or public use of
a stream is a public nuisance,30 3 was distinguished on the ground that
the statement was made in the context of a discharge that was unquestionably a statutory public nuisance, and was not necessarily made with
the intent of broadening the definition of common law public nui3 04
sance.
In applying the principles discussed in the earlier cases, the court
found none of the factors that led other courts to find a nuisance
existed in Barnes & Tucker:
The waters of the Commonwealth here in question are and for a
long period of time have been polluted by sewage and acid mine
drainage from closed or "abandoned" mines. Except for some deWater Co., 377 Pa. 636, 105 A.2d 722 (1954), the court held that once the Water and
Power Resources Board, which the court viewed as an arm of the legislature, had approved a particular project, that project could not be held to be a nuisance. If the exclusion of acid mine drainage from the provisions of the Clean Streams Law can be read
as "approving" acid mine drainage, then it would follow from the Collegeville Borough
case that acid mine drainage is not a nuisance. But the exclusion in the 1937 Act hardly
"approves" acid mine drainage. See quotation accompanying note 57 supra. It only postpones regulation until such time as effective treatment or abatement methods are developed. That hardly seems a basis for holding that acid mine drainage cannot be a
public nuisance in the meantime.
297. 288 Pa. 83, 85 A. 1102 (1913). In McCune mine water at the bottom of a bore hole
was pumped to the surface and discharged to a clean stream crossing plaintiff's land. The
court held that, once such an active discharge had been shown, the burden of proof
passed to defendant to show that there was no other practicable way to dispose of the
water, and that the defendant's burden had not been met.
298. 212 Pa. 115, 61 A. 811 (1905). In Roaring Creek water was pumped from a mine
to a pure stream, when for "a trifling expense" it could have been conveyed to another
stream "where it would injure no one." Id. at 116, 61 A. at 812. The grant of a preliminary injunction was sustained.
299. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 55 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
300. Pennsylvania R.R.v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924).
301. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 57 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
302. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d
439 (1951).
303. Id. at 48-49, 79 A.2d at 441.
304. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 58-59 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
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veloping recreational uses there is no evidence that these waters
in their polluted state are used for public purposes. Nor do we
have in this case facts supporting concepts of negligence, foreseeability or unlawful conduct, being elements of seemingly persuasive force in some of the cases. Similarly, factors? of a present
activity on the part of the owner or user of the land or of a course
of conduct directly producing the deleterious result are absent in
this case.
What we do have is . . . the forces of nature at work which

forces-given the location of the closed mine and the volume of
water entering it by percoiation and subterranean flow-produced
a breakout which resulted in further pollution of a polluted stream
from the acid mine drainage forced out of the mine.305
The court felt that the history of the legislature's dealing with acid
mine drainage must be considered, even in deciding whether the drainage in question was a common law public nuisance.
Considering the legislative history, the lawful operation and
closure of Mine No. 15 at all times and the other salient facts of
this case, we cannot today declare--solely for the reason that B &cT
and its predecessors created a subsurface artificial condition by
reason of mining-that a breakout of mine water through the
forces of nature at work adjunctive to said artificial condition,
constitutes aI public nuisance for which B &T is responsible today.
The Commonwealth through the legislature, has recognized that
the pollution or further pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth by mine drainage is deleterious to the health and welfare
to the citizens of Pennsylvania. As to the future it has empowered
the government to place responsibility upon operators for postmining discharge. As to the past, it has declared that the government shall be3 0 6responsible for such discharge for closed or abandoned mines.

In light of this legislative history, the court apparently felt it
would be coming very close to retroactively penalizing Barnes & Tucker
to hold them liable to treat, starting in 1970, pollution that was defined
as pollution in 1970, but was not defined as pollution during the largest
portion of the time during which the mining activities that led to
the discharge took place. Thus, Barnes 9c Tucker, the court felt, could
not have known, when they mined coal from the No. 15 mine prior
to 1965, that they might be required to treat, possibly in perpetuity,
acid mine drainage that might be caused by that mining. That observa305. Id. at 59-60.
306. Id. at 61.
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tion, that thought, which is really at the core' of the objection to retro-.
active legislation, whether criminal or not, seemed to dominate the dis3 07
cussion of all four issues.
CONCLUSION

The state of the law in Pennsylvania with respect to. acid mine
drainage may be summarized with two observations about Harmar and
Pittsburgh 08 and Barnes & Tucker.3 09
- (1) It is certainly true, as appellees argued at length in their brief,
that there are limitations to the right of a legislature to declare something, by statute, a public nuisance. 10 "The general power of a [government] to declare, prevent, and abate a nuisance does not include the
power to declare anything a nuisance which is not one in fact nor one
per se."' 3 11
However, as the United States Supreme Court said in Lawton v.,
Steele, one of the leading cases on .this point:
While the legislature has no right arbitrarilyto declare that to
be a nuisance which is clearly not so, a good deal must be left to
.its discretion in that regard, and if the object to be accomplished
is conducive to the public interests,
it may exercise a large liberty.
3 12
of choice in the means employed.

The question is, of course, how far can the legislature go without
crossing this nearly invisible boundary? Does it matter that the activity
that is being declared a nuisance is one that has in the past been encouraged? This was claimed to be the case with coal mining.8 13 But it
is not the mining that is being penalized now, it is the discharge of
acid mine drainage-and that, while tolerated before, was hardly encouraged.
By one interpretation, the most significant extension that the Clean
Streams Law makes, beyond the Sagamore314 decision, is to broaden
307. Id. at 38-41, 43, 44-45, 48-49, 60-61.
308. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
309. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
310. Brief for Appellee on appeal from Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board at
68-85, Commonwealth v. Hammar Coal Co., Civil No. 90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
•311. City of Twin Falls v. Harlan, 27 Idaho 769, 776, 151 P. 1191, 1195 (1915); see
Dougherty v. Messner, 404 Pa. 235, 172 A.2d 288 (1961). But see Commonwealth v. Dietz,
285 Pa. 511, 132 A. 572 (1926).
312. 152 U.S. 133, 140 (1893).
313. Brief for Appellee on appeal from Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board
at 72, Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil No. 90 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
314. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924).
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vastly the definition of public use. Certainly this is true if we consider
only the reach of the law-as distinguished from the administrative
machinery created to define standards and enforce the law. In Sagamore
the supreme court held that where a stream is put to a public use it is
a public nuisance to discharge acid mine water into it. In 1924, the
court was willing to find as a matter of common law that using water
for drinking and domestic purposes was a public use, and that use by
the Pennsylvania Railroad for its locomotives was also a public use.3 15
In Harmar and Pittsburgh the court was ready to accept the judgment of the legislature that future economic development, 16 and future outdoor recreation, 17 are public uses, and the implicit judgment
of the legislature that all streams in the state, whether or not now clean
are or will be devoted to a public use. 18
Once it is accepted that all streams are devoted to a public use, the
power of the Commonwealth to compel the abatement of acid mine
drainage stemming from active mining is clear, and one need only
cite Sagamore to prove

it. 3 19

So viewed, Harmar and Pittsburgh goes

very little farther than did Sagamore, nearly 50 years ago.
The commonwealth court in Barnes & Tucker evinced some doubt
that future public uses "are" public uses.3 20 But the commonwealth
court was even more concerned about making acid mine drainage from
an abandoned mine a public nuisance where substantially all the
mining that gave rise to the discharge took place prior to 1965, when
the Clean Streams Act was amended to apply to acid mine drainage
into already polluted waters such as the West Branch of the Susquehanna.

21

The retroactivity problem is inherent in the application of common
law nuisance doctrine. The activities that turn out to be an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of life or property, that is
to create a nuisance, public or private, may not appear to be unreason322
able at the time they are performed. A recent case in Massachusetts
315. Id. at 247, 126 A. at 391; see text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
316. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 2, Pa. P.L. 374, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.4 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 4, Pa. P.L. 1987; see note 66 supra.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924). See also
Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439
(1951); Commonwealth v. Dietz, 285 Pa. 511, 132 A. 572 (1926).
320. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 59 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973); see note
305 supra.
321. Id.
322. Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
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went so far as to require a pig farmer to cease operations on the ground
that the farm was a private nuisance with respect to the surrounding residential area, even though that area had built up and had become a
residential area after his pig farm was in operation. Not only did his
farm not appear to be a nuisance during most of its existence, it was
clearly not a nuisance until the area around it was developed as a residential community. 2 3 Even there, however, the activity that was enjoined was an ongoing activity. New, stricter environmental restraints
are frequently applied to ongoing activities because of changed circumstances, 324 or because of a better recognition of harmful effects as, for
example, new epidemiological studies are performed.3 25 In the Barnes
& Tucker situation, there is no ongoing activity; the drainage is occurring now, but all of the mining that gave rise to the drainage occurred
prior to the time when that drainage was generally recognized as being
a public nuisance. 326 In a situation that might have fallen under the
principle enunciated in Sagamore, or one of the other early nuisance
cases, this problem might not be controlling. Nor would it be controlling if the supreme court views section 3 of the Clean Streams Law3 27 as
broadening, as of the time of its enactment in 1937, the definition of
public nuisance as applied to acid mine drainage. But the retroactivity
problem will necessarily be central to the legal issues surrounding the
control of that two-thirds of acid mine drainage that emanates from
328
abandoned or inactive mines.
323. Id. at 312, 187 N.E.2d at 144.
324. As, for example, in the field of air pollution control, where, in Pennsylvania,
"air basins," areas that are built up, with many sources of air pollutants, are subjected
to more stringent regulations than areas with relatively few sources, and relatively little air
pollution. Regulations, Pa. Dept. of Env. Resources, 25 PA. CODE §§ 22.11, 22.22-.23, 22.26
(1972). It is obviously contemplated that if a non-air basin area builds up and becomes
more polluted, sources located there will be subjected to more stringent regulations.
325. Again using the development of air pollution regulation as an example, primary
ambient air quality standards which state how clean we want the air we live and move
about in to be--are set by the federal government, under the Clean Air Act as
amended in 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4 to -5 (1970), according to the best information
available relative to the health effects of the various air pollutants for which standards
are set. Once these standards are set, the emission or effluent limitations that directly
affect a particular source of air pollutants will tend to be controlled by the severity of
the ambient air quality standards relative to existing air quality. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4
(1970) explicitly provides: "Such primary standards may be revised in the same manner
as promulgated." It is clearly contemplated that, if information on the effects of particular
pollutants on human health is developed, through epidemiological studies or any other
research, that indicates more stringent ambient air quality standards should be imposed,
then the standards will be changed.
326. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970, at 48-49, 60-61 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
327. Act of June 22, 1937, § 3, Pa. P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 691.3 (Supp. 1973).
328. See note 18 supra; text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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(2) How the law ultimately deals with the retroactivity issue, as
well as other issues left by Harmar and Pittsburgh and Barnes &
Tucker, may be influenced by what we identify as an interpretational
bias on the part of the supreme court. Every time there was a choice
between a broad and a narrow interpretation of the Clean Streams
Law, 2 9 the supreme court in Harmar and Pittsburghchose the broad
interpretation.8 30 If there was any doubt whether the law applied to
the activity in question, the court seemed disposed to apply it.
Three times, the court gave as a reason for reaching a particular
conclusion the importance of controlling pollution. Once, implicitly
referring back to the statement of purpose of the Clean Streams Law, 831
the court gave as a reason for broadly interpreting the term "industrial
waste" to include the discharge of water from inactive mines in the
Irwin Basin that: "[t]o permit this discharge to the surface and ignore
its essential role in Pittsburgh's mining operation is to promote rather
than abate pollution. 8 32 The second time, already referred to,333 the
court cited the Environmental Declaration of Rights, article I, section
27 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, as one reason for finding an
overriding public interest in the abatement of acid mine drainage, that
would be sufficient to support the strict review of the constitutionality
of the Commonwealth's actions in these cases.
The third time it also cited the Statutory Construction Act, 8 4 to
the effect "that the legislature intends to favor the public interest as
against any private interest," thus making its interpretational "bias"
explicit. 335
83 7
The commonwealth court, in Pittsburgh Coals8" and Harmar Coal,
and much more explicitly in Barnes & Tucker,338 seems to have regarded the legislature as moving only tentatively into the field of
acid mine drainage regulation in 1965, finally making the extent
of its commitment clear only in 1970.39 While, as noted above, 4 0
329. Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1.1001 (Supp. 1973).
330. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 11 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
331. Id. at 5.
332. Id. at 12-13.
333. Id. at 16.
334. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 552 (1969).
335. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., Civil Nos. 89-90, at 24 (Pa., Mar. 16, 1973).
336. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. 407, 286 A.2d 459 (1972).
337. 4 Pa. Comm. Ct. 435, 285 A.2d 898 (1972).
338. No. 896-A Transfer Docket 1970 (Pa. Comm. Ct., Apr. 16, 1973).
339. Id. at 39-40.
340. See note 129 sulbra.
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reasonable men might differ on this question, a reading of the statement of policy in the 1965 amendments would seem to support the
supreme court's view. The commonwealth court in Barnes & Tucher
hardly mentioned that statement of policy;3 41 in the supreme court's
opinion in Harmar and Pittsburgh, it was a central point in the decision.
Which ever is correct in the abstract, of course, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania speaks last. Whether the interpretational leaning in favor
of applying the Clean Streams Law is enough to support the application
of section 3342 to any discharge resulting from mining that took place
after 1937, based in part on the Statutory Construction Act,3 43 legislative and constitutional changes, 38 and changes in public attitudes
that have occurred recently, must remain an open question.
341. See pp 507-08 supra.
342. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.3 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937, § 3,
Pa. P.L. 1987.
343. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 552 (1969).
344. Pa. Const. art. 1, § 27 (see note 136 supra); Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 2, Pa. P.L. 374,
as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.4 (Supp. 1973), amending Act of June 22, 1937,
§ 4, Pa. P.L. 1987 (statement of policy in the 1965 amendments).
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